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ABSTRACT
CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS PLANNING PREPAREDNESS
OF NCAA DIVISION 1 ATHLETIC DEPARTMENTS
by Brandon Lane Allen
December 2011
Collegiate athletic departments face the same threats of private and public
businesses. Multiple disruptive events have caused havoc at various athletic
events causing change of venues, loss of revenue, injuries, and deaths. Natural
disasters and terrorism continue to pose serious threats on all types of
organizations; therefore, athletic departments must become proactive in preparing
for the unexpected (Wheatman, 2001).
The purpose of this study was to assess NCAA division 1 athletic
departments’ continuity of operations planning preparedness. The population for
this study was limited to athletic directors or facility directors responsible for
continuity of operations planning (N=344). A total of 91 completed surveys were
returned for a 26% response rate. The total score from the 26-item questionnaire
(derived from FEMA’s guidelines for continuity of operation planning) was used to
measure the institution’s level of preparedness.
Demographic variables consisting of number of students, budget of athletic
department, type of institution (public or private), location of institution (FEMA’s 10
regions) and experience of a presidential disaster (received federal funding for
recovery), were used for hypothetical testing with the alpha level set at 0.05.
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Descriptive statistics (frequencies, means, and standard deviations) and an
analysis of variance were used to conduct the analysis. Tukey’s HSD post hoc
test was used as a follow up on the statistical significant difference in athletic
budget to determine the location of the difference. The average mean of 3.44 on a
5-point Likert scale (1=no progress; 5=Objective achieved) revealed areas of
concern for NCAA division 1 athletic departments continuity of operations planning
preparedness. Athletic departments should be proactive in developing and
implementing COOP measures in order to resume normal operations in the event
of an accident.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Within the last 10 years, over 560 presidential disaster declarations were
issued throughout the United States (FEMA, 2010f). Even though the majority of
these events fell into the severe storm category, other major disasters, such as
hurricanes, earthquakes, typhoons, fires, floods, and terrorist attacks, totaled
109. At least two of these major disasters could be found in each of the 10
regions designated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). In
2010, there were 81 major federal disaster declarations across the United States
(FEMA, 2010e). Since all cities are susceptible to a major disaster, organizations
and institutions should have a continuity plan in place to continue operations of
essential functions and minimize or eliminate the amount of time an institution is
shut down from normal operations.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) supports the idea
that public and private organizations should provide continuity plans. It views
these plans as a basic entitlement to the nation’s citizens (2009a). Colleges and
universities are no exception to the rule. After Hurricane Katrina in 2005,
students from at least 12 colleges and universities were displaced and relocated
to other areas in the country waiting for direction from their institution on what to
do next (Wolverton, 2005). Tulane University seemed to be a leader in
disseminating information to its students. The university’s president, Scott S.
Cowen, posted a blog on Tulane’s website informing faculty, staff, and students
of the progress on behalf of those involved. After it was apparent that the
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university would remain closed through the 2005 fall semester, he turned his
attention to providing opportunities for the students. On September 1, 2005,
Cowen contacted the American Council on Education, the National Association
of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, and the American Association of
State Colleges and Universities. Subsequently, representatives of the respective
organizations discussed how other universities around the country could provide
assistance to the students at Tulane (Cowen, 2005). These accrediting bodies of
Higher Education along with the American Association of Community Colleges,
the Council of Independent Colleges, and the Association of Jesuit Colleges and
Universities made a decision to allow paid students of the affected institutions to
attend their institutions without tuition charge. Included in the plans were
provisions for student athletes (Boggs et al., 2005). Cowen made it clear that the
athletic program was an integral part of reestablishing its program. He stated
that, “we want our athletes to carry the torch, face, and name of Tulane
University during this difficult time” (Cowen, 2005, p. 1).
As exemplified by Tulane, continuity planning is a necessity for colleges
and universities, and special considerations should be made regarding athletic
programs. Wolverton (2005) acknowledged the fact that many institutions have
crisis-management plans. However, most of these institutions do not include
procedures that provide for displaced athletes and damaged facilities in order to
continue their athletic programs. To support this claim, Wolverton quoted the
Commissioner of the Sunbelt Conference, Wright Waters, as saying that
“[c]onferences and teams make plans for if it rains, but we don’t plan much

3
beyond that” (p. 37). Hurricanes Katrina and Rita impacted at least 12 collegiate
teams in multiple athletic conferences (Wolverton, 2005).
Continuity planning is necessary to combat all threats including weather,
crowd management, and terrorism. Hall, Marciani, and Cooper (2007) shed light
on the potential of sport venues as terrorist targets. For example, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) posted warnings that reported some terrorist groups
were downloading stadium images. The downloading of this information
supports the tactics of these terrorist groups by targeting large groups of people
in one place. There are multiple examples of unexpected events that have
closed down normal operations in athletic organizations from little league to
professional teams. Therefore, continuity planning is critical in order to assure
that all institutions maintain normal operations if or when an unexpected event
occurs (e.g. weather, crowd control, or terrorism).
Purpose of the Study
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (2009b) is clear about its
position on continuity planning stating that “[c]ontinuity planning is a fundamental
responsibility of public institutions and private entities to our nation’s citizens” (p.
2). FEMA continues to stress the importance of these plans by stating that,
Today’s changing threat environment and the potential for no-notice
emergencies, including localized acts of nature, accidents, technological
system failures, and military or terrorist attack-related incidents, have
increased the need for continuity capabilities and planning across all
levels of government and the private sector. (p. 2)
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Unfortunately, research is limited regarding COOP in athletic departments.
Since continuity planning is a fundamental responsibility for public and private
institutions, athletic departments of higher education should have some type of
planning in place. With the prevalent and inerrant risks of terrorism and natural
disasters, these departments need to be prepared (Hall, Marciani, & Cooper,
2007). Guidelines should be available to offset any delays in functionality. The
purpose of this study is to determine the level of preparedness of the National
College Athletic Association (NCAA) Division 1 athletic departments in regard to
continuity planning. This study will identify the current status and needs of
athletic departments and the gaps and discrepancies in continuity planning. This
study will provide recommendations and resources to strengthen current
procedures. Recommendations for athletic departments may include identifying
the following: (a) essential functions; (b) orders of succession; (c) delegation of
authority; (d) continuity facilities; (e) continuity communications; (f) vital records
management; (g) human capital; (h) test, training, and exercise programs; (i)
devolution of control and direction; (j) reconstitution operations; (k) program plans
and procedures; (l) risk management; (m) budgeting and acquisition of
resources; and (n) continuity plan operational phases and implementation. Since
continuity planning is a fundamental responsibility of public and private entities, it
is highly recommended that athletic departments reinforce compliance with
federal government guidelines and recommendations (FEMA, 2009c).
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Hypotheses
The following hypotheses will guide this study:
H1 : There will be no significant difference in the level of preparedness
among athletic programs based on geographical locations of the 10
regions declared by FEMA.
H2 : There will be no significant difference in the level of preparedness
among athletic programs based on membership in a conference.
H3 : There will be no significant difference in the level of preparedness
among athletic programs based on the number of students enrolled at the
institution.
H4: There will be no significant difference in the level of preparedness
among athletic programs based on a presidential declared disaster
occurring within the last 10 years.
H5: There will be no significant difference in the level of preparedness
among athletic programs based on athletic budget.
H6: There will be no significant difference in the level of preparedness
among athletic programs based on type of institution (public or private).
Definitions of Terms
For the purpose of this research study, the following terms are defined:
All-hazards: “An approach for prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response,
continuity, and recovery that addresses a full range of threats and hazards,
including natural, human-caused, and technology-caused” (National Fire
Protection Association [NFPA], 2010, p. 5).
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Business continuity management: “The act of anticipating incidents which will
affect mission-critical functions and processes for the organization and ensuring
that it responds in a planned rehearsed manner” (Gallagher, 2003, p. 3).
Business Impact Analysis (BIA): A categorical process of ranking essential
functions based on level of impact that contributes to organizational survival
(Cornish, 1999).
Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)/Business Continuity Plan (BCP): An
“ongoing process supported by senior management and funded to ensure that
the necessary steps are taken to identify the impact of potential losses, maintain
viable recovery strategies, recovery plans, and continuity of services” (NFPA,
2010, p. 5).
Continuity communications: “Communications that provide the capability to
perform essential functions, in conjunction with other organizations until normal
operations can be resumed” (FEMA, 2009c, p. 4).
Continuity facilities: “Locations where an organization’s leadership and staff
operate. Facilities should be able to provide staff with survivable protection and
should enable continued and endurable operations” (FEMA, 2009c, p. 3).
Delegation of authority: “Identification, by position, of the authorities for making
policy determinations and decisions at HQ, field levels, and all other
organizational locations” (FEMA, 2009c, p. 2).
Devolution of control and direction: “The capability to transfer statutory authority
and responsibility for essential functions from an organization’s primary operating
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staff and facilities to other organization employees and facilities, and to sustain
that operational capability for an extended period” (FEMA, 2009c, p. 2).
Disaster recovery (DR): The reaction to a disruption of normal operations with the
purpose of restoring operations in a timely and orderly fashion (Ketterer, Price, &
McFadden, 2007).
Essential functions: Those functions which are critical to the ongoing survival of
organizations, especially after a disruption of normal activities (Cornish, 1999).
Human capital: “An organization’s ability to respond and adapt rapidly to threats
posed to its workforce” (Ketterer et al., 2007, p. 8).
Mitigation: “Activities taken to reduce the impacts from hazards” (NFPA, 2010, p.
6).
Orders of succession: “Provisions for the assumption of senior agency offices
during an emergency in the event that any of those officials are unavailable to
execute their legal duties” (NFPA, 2010, p. 5).
Preparedness: “Ongoing activities, tasks, and systems to develop, implement,
and maintain program capabilities” (NFPA, 2010, p. 6).
Presidential disaster declaration: Any disaster that is beyond the capability of the
state and local governments to respond. Once a request from a governor is
received by a FEMA regional office, the President may then declare a major
disaster, thereby allowing access to federal funding for response and recovery
(FEMA, 2010g).
Prevention: “Activities to avoid an incident or to stop an incident from occurring”
(NFPA, 2010, p. 6).
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Recovery: “Activities and programs designed to return conditions to a level that is
acceptable to the entity” (NFPA, 2010, p. 6). “Recovery is the perceived time to
return to a pre-crisis profit level or production level” (Lasecki, 2009, p. 9).
Region 1: The states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, and Vermont (FEMA, 2010d).
Region 2: The states of New Jersey, New York, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands (FEMA, 2010d).
Region 3: The states of Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, and West Virginia (FEMA, 2010d).
Region 4 : The states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee (FEMA, 2010d).
Region 5: The states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and
Wisconsin (FEMA, 2010d).
Region 6: The states of Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas
(FEMA, 2010d).
Region 7: The states of Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska (FEMA, 2010d).
Region 8: The states of Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah,
and Wyoming (FEMA, 2010d).
Region 9: The states of American Samoa, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii,
Nevada, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Federated States of
Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (FEMA, 2010d).
Region 10: The states of Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington (FEMA,
2010d).
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Risk management: The process of identifying, controlling, and minimizing the
impact of uncertain events (FEMA, 2009c; Shaw & Smith, 2010).
Reconstitution: “The process by which surviving and/or replacement organization
personnel resume normal agency operations from the original or replacement
primary operating facility” (FEMA, 2009c, p. 6).
Test, training, and exercises (TT&E): “Measures to ensure that an organization’s
continuity plan is capable of supporting the continued execution of the
organization’s essential functions throughout the duration of a continuity
situation” (FEMA, 2009c, p. 6).
Vital records management: “Electronic and hardcopy documents, references, and
records that are needed to support essential functions during a continuity
situation” (FEMA, 2009c, p. 6).
Delimitations
This study will be will be delimited to current senior, associate, and
assistant athletic directors and facility directors from NCAA Division 1 schools.
Assumptions
The assumptions of this study are as follows:
1.

All subjects will answer accurately and honestly all questions on the

Continuity Level of Preparedness Questionnaire.
2.

All subjects will be either a current senior, associate, or assistant

athletic director or facility director from an NCAA Division 1A school and
have prior knowledge and understanding of plans and procedures
concerning continuity of operations.
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Justification
Universities are beginning to take action regarding continuity planning.
Six universities (Tulane University, University of Alaska-Fairbanks, University of
California-Berkeley, University of Miami, University of North Carolina-Wilmington,
and University of Washington) have collaborated with FEMA and created a
document titled Building a Disaster-Resistant University (FEMA, 2003). Other
documents, such as ERM in Higher Education (University Risk Management and
Insurance Association, 2007), Developing a Strategy to Manage Enterprise-wide
Risk in Higher Education (Cassidy, Goldstein, Johnson, Mattie, & Morley, 2001),
and Continuity Planning for Schools and Universities (Henderson, 2005;
Henderson, December 2005), share similar concerns regarding risk management
and continuity planning at institutions of higher education. These documents
focus on pre-disaster planning and mitigation actions and shed light on the
unique planning considerations of institutions of higher education. Even though
these documents fail to cover all aspects of continuity planning, they do take into
consideration multiple elements of a viable continuity plan. Henderson (2005)
reported that even if a university has a COOP plan in place, each organizational
unit within that university should be responsible for its own specific
responsibilities, which include disaster preparations and response assignments.
Henderson (2005) stated that it is not uncommon for some departments of
schools and universities to have excellent plans while other departments have no
plans. Since the athletic department falls into this category, the primary focus of
this study is to assess and document the level of preparedness of athletic
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departments at NCAA Division 1 colleges and universities. Currently, there is a
lack of literature supporting the preparedness level of athletic departments
regarding continuity planning. However, studies have been conducted at
universities on various elements of continuity of operation planning within athletic
departments. These studies are examined and explained in the literature review.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
This chapter reviews literature relevant to the involvement of non-federal
entities with an emphasis on state and private sectors. By way of organization, it
divides the literature into continuity of operation planning (COOP), Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), theoretical frameworks, Elements of
COOP, National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division 1 studies,
potential hazards, and conclusion.
Continuity of Operation Planning
Because of the changing threat of environment and recent emergencies,
the need for continuity of operation planning capabilities has become more
prevalent in agencies and public institutions (Shaw & Harrald, 2004). All
organizations face the possibility of disruptive events affecting normal operations
in some capacity; therefore, organizations have used functions such as risk
management, emergency response, and contingency planning as a means to
mitigate relevant threats to their environment (Shaw & Harrald, 2004). One way
these facilities can combat against these threats of disasters is preparedness
(Waugh, 2000). McIntire (2007) defined disasters “as deadly, destructive, and
disruptive events that occur when a hazard interacts (or multiple hazards
interact) with human vulnerability” (p. 2). Taking this definition at face value
means that even a threat could be considered a disaster if it causes an event to
be disrupted. The threat in and of itself is considered a hazard and cannot cause
a catastrophe until it is carried out.
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The National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan and the National
Security Presidential Directive 51/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 20
define continuity of operation planning (COOP) as “an effort within individual
executive departments and agencies to ensure that Primary Mission Essential
Functions (PMEFs) continue to be performed during a wide range of
emergencies, including localized acts of nature, accidents, and technological or
attack-related emergencies” (Petersen, 2007, p. 3). These primary essential
functions are a subset of the mission essential functions which must be
performed continuously uninterrupted or resumed within 12 hours after an event
(FEMA, 2009c). Both mission essential functions and primary essential functions
provide the organization the ability to maintain the safety of the public, provide
vital services, and sustain the economic base in case of a disruption of normal
operations (FEMA, 2009c). The United States policy regarding all federal
agencies is to have an effective and comprehensive continuity plan in place
(FEMA, 2001). During President Ronald Reagan’s years of service in the oval
office, he passed Executive Order 12656 which assures continuity of
government. This order mandates that all levels of government should have
sufficient capabilities to withstand an emergency regardless of nature (Executive
Order No. 12656, 1988). As an enforcement measure, Presidential Declaration
Directive 67 empowered FEMA with the responsibility of assuring compliance
across the Federal Executive Branch in regard to developing, executing,
facilitating, overseeing, and accessing the status of COOP capabilities (FEMA,
2001). FEMA has played a significant role in COOP planning in the
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governmental sector and devoted itself to assisting and preparing other entities in
COOP planning by providing financial resources and relevant literature specific to
each type of organization (FEMA, 2003; FEMA, 2009c; FEMA, 2009e).
Ketterer et al. (2007) associated the phrase “decade of disaster” in an
attempt to adequately portray the first 10 years of the 21st century. In order to
support this claim, Ketterer et al. used data from the emergency management
database which declared the top three disasters according to number of deaths
in 2005 were Pakistan, Guatemala, and the United States. The report continued
to list the countries that suffered the most natural disasters in 2005 by listing the
Republic of China with 31, India with 30, and the United States with 16. FEMA
reported that within the last 10 years there have been over 560 presidential
disaster declarations in every region of the United States (FEMA, 2010f). Even
though the majority of these events fell into the severe storm category, other
major disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, typhoons, fires, floods, and
terrorist attacks totaled 109. At least two of these major disasters could be found
in each of the 10 regions designated by FEMA (2010f). In 2010, there were 81
major federal disaster declarations across the United States (FEMA, 2010e).
The financial costs of these natural disasters can be horrendous. For example,
estimates for the cost of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were assessed at $131
billion (Ketterer et al., 2007).
Recent events from this decade, starting with the devastating effects of
September 11, 2001, have reinforced the need for businesses to consider and
put in place continuity capabilities and planning (Barbara, 2006; Whitworth,
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2006). Every city is susceptible to a major disaster; therefore, organizations and
institutions should have a continuity plan in place. To reiterate this fact,
Henderson (2005) stated that 80% of the states within the United States are at
risk for earthquake damage. Henderson also says that 10% of the United States
land area is subject to flooding. “Continuity cannot be an afterthought for
organizations as they strive to perform their essential functions” (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 2).
FEMA (2009a) supports the idea that public and private organizations
should provide continuity plans. It states that continuity planning allows for the
performance of essential functions during any disruption of normal operations.
This planning process is a fundamental responsibility to our nation’s citizens
(FEMA, 2009c). FEMA continues to stress the importance of these plans by
stating that
Today’s changing threat environment and the potential for no-notice
emergencies, including localized acts of nature, accidents, technological
system failures, and military or terrorist attack-related incidents, have
increased the need for continuity capabilities and planning across all
levels of government and the private sector. (2009c, p. 2).
COOP, commonly called business continuity planning (BCP) in the private
sector, seeks to recover from all hazards that may pose a threat to the primary
essential functions of the organization. These threats could come from natural
disasters, such as fires or floods, but they could also resemble the form of
unethical operations or the collapse of a key supplier (Gallagher, 2003).
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Dunaway (2010) reported the two key factors that determine the adoption of
continuity planning measures for private organizations are the size of the
organization and previous experience with a disaster. The data, retrieved from
145 businesses, industries, and non-profit organizations, revealed four factors
that could influence an organization to reconsider its need for COOP planning.
Dunaway (2010) identified these factors as follows:
1. Geographic proximity (exposure): the physical proximity or exposure
of a private sector entity to hazards or threats that effect the
organization and its environment.
2. Temporal proximity (experience): whether, and if so, how recently a
private sector entity had experience with a disaster or emergency that
affected the organization.
3. Proximity of capability (capability): whether the private sector entity has
at hand the capability to manage a threat to its viability assessed as a
function of the entity’s size.
4. Organizational proximity (collaboration): whether or not the private
sector entity participates in a collaborative organization for regional
emergency planning and preparedness (p. 126).
In 2007, the Chartered Management Institute and the Civil Contingencies
Secretariat completed the eighth survey on BCM since 1999 (Woodman, 2007).
From the 10,600 institute members surveyed, a total of 1,257 responded.
Woodman (2007) compiled and presented the research which addressed a wide
range of threats that companies encounter across the United Kingdom. In the
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study, Woodman (2007) identified proximity of capability as a factor in
businesses having a BCP in place, and large organizations (over 250
employees) are more likely to have BCPs than small or medium organizations.
The size of the organization supported Dunaway’s (2010) research as a key
factor in determining BCP. Woodman (2007) also stated that BCPs are more
common in the public sector than in private or not-for-profit organizations. This
finding by Woodman may be due to mandates by the Civil Contingencies Act on
public sector organizations. Interestingly, Woodman (2007) lists construction and
education at the bottom for those companies having BCPs.
Previous experience with a disaster has proved to be an ineffective means
to assure COOP planning simply because many organizations cease to exist
after a disaster. According to Gallagher (2003), 40% of enterprises that
experience a disaster close their doors within five years. Cerullo and Cerullo
(2004) cited a similar finding that 43% of companies never reopen and another
29% fail within two years after such a disaster. Runyan and Huddleston (2009)
interviewed small business owners and local officials from the Gulf Coast after
Hurricane Katrina and found that they did not plan for disasters and were having
difficulties recovering from the impact of Katrina. Therefore, COOP planning
must be integrated before a disaster. The highest level of management must
brainstorm all potential threats to organizations and make plans for combating
these hazards (FEMA, 2009c).
Key considerations in reducing organizational failure include assuring
continuous performance of essential functions, protecting essential facilities,
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reducing loss of life, and achieving an orderly and timely recovery from an
emergency (FEMA, 1999). The Health and Human Services Disaster Recovery
Leadership Network (DRLN) of Pinellas County (2007) addressed the complexity
of creating a COOP and stated the following:
Developing a COOP requires forethought, flexibility, and more than a little
fearlessness. It means spending considerable time, effort and possibly
some money anticipating worst-possible scenarios. It means preparing,
even practicing, for a major disaster’s impact on every aspect of business,
community, and life as we typically know it. It means recognizing that
some of your organization’s most severe losses will occur after the initial
catastrophe and disruption of services; this may include subsequent loss
of funding, employee attrition and damage to the agency’s reputation. (p.
9)
The Health and Human Services DRLN (2007) continues to stress the
importance of COOP by promoting interagency and inter-governmental
collaboration. The DRLN works with human service agencies in an effort to
prepare these agencies to assist the public at the earliest opportunity should a
major disaster occur (Health and Human Services DRLN, 2007). This
organization has put together a workbook for human services which details the
process for continuity of operations planning and disaster recovery. Its ultimate
view of a COOP plan is simply a “how-to” plan. Momani (2010) found only 10%
out of 35% of small- and medium-sized businesses with a comprehensive
disaster recovery plan actually implement the plans.
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Federal Emergency Management Agency
FEMA was formed in 1979 when President Jimmy Carter passed
Executive Order (EO) 12127 naming FEMA as the centralized agency
responsible for disaster-related federal emergency functions (FEMA, 2010c).
This executive order merged over 100 programs responsible for preparation and
quick response to disasters (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009).
Multiple agencies, such as the Federal Insurance Administration, the Federal
Disaster Assistance Administration, the National Fire Prevention and Control
Administration, the National Weather Service Community Preparedness
Program, and the Federal Preparedness Agency of the General Services
Administration were included in the merger (FEMA, 2010c). The purpose for the
creation of FEMA was to merge these agencies into one centralized agency as a
means to decrease the complexity of seeking federal disaster relief for states and
local governments (FEMA, 2010c). Multiple changes to this new agency
continued to occur throughout the years.
One major change occurred with the formation of the United States
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In 1998, officials in Washington
created the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century because of the
belief that the U.S. National Security Polices needed to be reexamined (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 2009). This belief was directly associated
with the rising threat of terrorism. The Commission preformed a comprehensive
review of the security polices and provided a strategy which included a
recommendation for a National Homeland Security Agency. The vision of this
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agency included the transfer of four federal agencies; the Coast Guard, the
Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and FEMA.
On March 21, 2001, a bill seeking to establish the National Homeland
Security Agency was introduced but never made it past the Government Reform
Committee. This bill would surface again after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and
eventually become law in 2002. In 2003, FEMA merged with U.S. Department of
Homeland Security with 21 other federal agencies (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 2009).
Currently, FEMA is the governing body responsible for ensuring that
federal agencies have a comprehensive and effective program in place which
ensures essential Federal functions are maintained under all hazards and
circumstances (FEMA, 2001). This responsibility includes coordinating “the
federal government’s role in preparing for, preventing, mitigating the effects of,
responding to, and recovering from all domestic disasters, whether natural or
man-made, including acts of terrors” (FEMA, 2010c, para.1). With all the
numerous activities that fall under FEMA’s responsibilities, the core of their
existence is to build and support our nation’s emergency management system
(FEMA, 2010h).
Theoretical Frameworks
Multiple developmental cycles for continuity of operation planning can be
found in the body of literature (Gibb & Buchanan, 2006; Lam, 2002; Maheshwari,
Rahul, Gaurav, & Singh, 2010; Shaw & Harrald, 2004; Smit, 2005; Smith, 2002).
FEMA promotes the continuity program management cycle (CPMC) as a
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standardized management cycle that ensures consistency across all continuity
programs. “It establishes consistent performance metrics, prioritizes
implementation plans, promulgates best practices, and facilitates consistent
cross-agency continuity evaluations” (FEMA, 2009c, p. 5). The continuity
program management cycle (CPMC) has been recommended by FEMA for the
use of all organizations in the creation and implementation of its continuity
programs (FEMA, 2009c). The supporting structures for CPMC lie within its
leaders, staff, communications, and facilities (FEMA, 2009c). These four key
areas, built upon the foundation of in-depth planning and program management,
enable the organization to perform its essential functions and increase its
continuity capacity. The cyclical process occurs through testing, training, and
exercising the plan so that a proper evaluation may be made on the process and
corrective actions taken if necessary. This cyclical process is common with all
BCP models in that testing and training are utilized in order to determine
discrepancies or weaknesses in the plan and corrective measures are
implemented. The essential functions for COOP that are covered in this model
are used as the framework for this study. Other models were examined and will
be discussed and compared with the CPMC.
All-Hazard Approach
An all-hazard approach is a philosophy that current disaster and
emergency management agencies use to address the essential phases of
emergency management (Whitworth, 2006). Many public institutions have
prepared for these uncertain events through the development of all-hazard
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planning (McConnell & Drennan, 2006). This approach seeks to identify all
potential threats that may disrupt normal operations and essential functions and
conduct risk assessments and vulnerability analyses that address mitigation,
preparedness, response, and recovery (Whitworth, 2006). An all-hazard
approach seems to comply with the goal of continuity planning in that it seeks to
reduce the consequences of any disruptive event (FEMA, 2009c).
Strategic Approach
The strategic approach utilizes a top-down model in which all business
recovery activities flow from the organization’s strategic goals (Institute of
Management and Administration [IOMA], 2007). It is “an approach that is
business-driven, based on a combination of planning and management, and
potentially leads to long-term value creation and organizational advantage”
(Herbane, Elliott, & Swartz, 2004, p. 439). Ritchie (2004) noted that the scope
and direction of the organization should take into account changing
environments, markets, and customers with the primary purpose of meeting
stakeholder expectations. The strategic approach naturally flows from the field of
crisis management, which is a precursor to BCM (Herbane et al., 2004). This is
evident in Smith’s (2002) definition of BCM which states,
Business Continuity Management (BCM) is not just about disaster
recovery, crisis management, risk management, control or technology
recovery. It is not just a professional specialist discipline but a business
owned and driven issue that unifies a broad spectrum of business and
management disciplines. In particular it provides the strategic and
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operational framework to review and where appropriate redesign the way
an organization provides its products and services whilst increasing its
resilience to disruption, interruption or loss. (p. 3)
Shaw and Harrald (2004) grouped business continuity and crisis
management into one model based on their belief that these two terms were
strongly correlated. This model served as a framework for the creation of an
upper level educational course used by FEMA for Higher Education projects
(Shaw & Harrald, 2004). The strategic approach strays away from following
“best practices” in business continuity planning because each corporation has
different objectives that target the peculiar dimensions of its business. Herbane
et al. (2004) recognized this approach as a means to enhance continuity of
operation capabilities in the event of a crisis or disaster. Strategic planners focus
on improving organizational performance by gaining an understanding of their
political environment, their competition, and their response to occurrences that
affect normal operations (Herbane et al., 2004). Again, by using the strategic
approach, companies seek to prepare defensively against crises while
maintaining offensive strategies to competitively compete in their market.
Holistic Approach
The holistic approach is very similar to the strategic approach. The
holistic approach “identifies potential impacts that threaten an organization and
provides a framework for building resilience and the capability for an effective
response that safeguards the interests of its key stakeholders, reputation, brand
and value creating activities” (Business Continuity Institute [BCI], 2007, p. 5).
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Woodman (2007) used this BCI definition as the foundation for the research
conducted by the Chartered Management Institute from his study. By definition,
BCI seems to resemble the strategic approach with the only difference between
the priorities of the models. The holistic approach to BCP seeks to assess and
address every business function within the organization with the idea that
segmentation by its very nature is incomplete (Glenn, cited in Ketterer et al.,
2008). Lam (2002), Glenn (cited in Ketterer et al., 2008), and Smit (2005) are
proponents of the holistic approach to BCI. Lam (2002) reported that the holistic
approach can been identified by the organization’s business continuity policy.
Lam identified eight core steps in the business continuity cycle that correspond
with the business continuity policy. These core steps are as follows:
1. Initiate the BCP project.
2. Identify business threats.
3. Conduct a risk analysis.
4. Establish business continuity plan.
5. Design business continuity plan.
6. Define business continuity process.
7. Test business continuity plan.
8. Review business continuity plan.
Glenn (cited in Ketterer et al., 2007) stated organizations that only
consider certain areas or segments of an organization to conduct BCP miss the
mark. These core steps enable an organization to create a business continuity
policy while establishing a holistic plan in the process (Lam, 2002).

25
Business Assurance and Risk Mitigation Approach
The business assurance and risk mitigation (BARM) approach allows
organizations to implement high-impact continuity and security elements at a
minimum cost (Shaw & Smith, 2010). This approach seeks to validate the
practice of continuity planning by determining if the implementation of continuity
practices is worth the financial cost. This tactic is accomplished by comparing
“the cost of implementing practices versus the cost of a major security or
continuity flaw which may result in significant loss of business, growth and
viability of the organization” (Shaw & Smith, 2010, p. 332). Shaw and Smith
(2010) agree that the developing stage of BCP should be kept simple for the
understanding of all employees. This training can take place during new
employee orientation as a cost-saving measure. Emergency evacuation and
tabletop exercises should be meaningful and simple.
Continuity of Operation Planning Elements
FEMA (2009a) has updated its components of a continuity plan to consist
of 10 elements of a viable continuity capability along with four supporting
components of a continuity program foundation. These elements, which serve as
the essential components necessary for COOP in this study, include the
following: (a) essential functions; (b) orders of succession; (c) delegation of
authority; (d) continuity facilities; (e) continuity communications; (f) vital records
management; (g) human capital; (h) test, training, and exercise programs; (i)
devolution of control and direction; (j) reconstitution operations; (k) program plans
and procedures; (l) risk management; (m) budgeting and acquisition of
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resources; and (n) continuity plan operational phases and implementation.
(FEMA, 2009a; FEMA, 2009c). These main categories are prevalent in the
literature. For instance, the National Fire Protection Association (2010)
compares its criteria for business continuity programs with the Disaster Recovery
Institute International (DRII) Professional Practices for Business Continuity
Practitioners and the Disaster Recovery Institute International as well as with the
elements of the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency. Gibb and Buchanan (2006) also mentioned these
elements.
Essential Functions
The foundation to any continuity plan is essential functions; therefore,
these functions must be determined before considering any of the other
continuity elements (FEMA, 2009c). Essential functions allow an organization to
provide vital services, exercise civil authority, maintain the safety of the general
public, and sustain the industrial and economic base (FEMA, 2009c). These
critical functions vary depending on the organization because they are primarily
determined by the organization’s customers and their needs. Many authors,
including Cerullo and Cerullo (2004) and Tammineedi (2010), call the process of
identifying these critical functions the Business Impact Analysis (BIA). Once
risks are identified, it is critical to rank or prioritize them by probability of
occurrence and level of impact on the business. When considering these risks
for the BIA, a “worst case scenario” approach should be used (Tammineedi,
2010). BIA phase then reviews these scenarios and attempts to predict the
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impact caused by these events upon the organization’s operations (Lasecki,
2009).
As noted earlier, a comprehensive continuity plan cannot be adequate
unless essential functions have been identified and prioritized, yet more than
40% of companies that have a so-called business continuity plan have never
conducted a business impact analysis (Cerullo & Cerullo, 2004). This failure to
include a BIA can be problematic and may contribute to businesses closing down
after a disaster. For example, Gallagher (2003) noted that 40% of enterprises
that experience a disaster are closed down within five years. Another study cited
by Cerullo and Cerullo (2004) found that 43% of companies never reopen after a
major disaster and another 29% fail within two years. FEMA’s study on the
effects of Hurricane Andrew reported that 80% of damaged businesses without a
BCP failed within two years (Cerullo & Cerullo, 2004). Therefore, organizations
would be wise to identify their essential functions and conduct a BIA so that
crucial programs and services to the organization’s mission are not interrupted
(Health and Human Services DRLN, 2007).
Delegations of Authorities
Another element needed for a viable continuity plan is called delegations
of authorities. Pre-delegating key leaders ensures a rapid response to
emergencies by training personnel to carry out specific duties when COOP is
activated (FEMA, 2009c). FEMA recommends these delegations be at least
three positions deep to ensure that Mission Essential Functions (MEFs) and
PMEFs are carried out during an emergency. All employees should know who is
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responsible to make key decisions during a continuity situation by creating a
predetermined chain of command (Momani, 2010). This plan will help clear any
confusion if a key leader is incapacitated during a crisis. Delegation of authority
should outline the authority of key decision makers in determining their power to
re-delegate functions and activities as they deem appropriate (FEMA, 2009c).
Delegations of authorities should be documented and kept with the other vital
records.
Orders of Succession
Orders of succession are also an essential part of continuity planning. In
the event key personnel become unavailable to perform their duties, orders of
succession would designate the critical roles and responsibilities to other
employees of the organization (FEMA, 2009c). These employees would take on
these roles and responsibilities if and when key leadership were unable to
perform their jobs such as death or resignation. Orders of succession should be
at least three positions deep and geographically dispersed (FEMA, 2009c). This
plan of action allows the organization to facilitate survivability and availability of
successors (Whitworth, 2006). NFPA (2010) lists order of succession under
common plan requirements. It states that entities shall identify lines of
succession and include them in continuity plans. These succession lines should
be identified by position titles rather than individual names (Whitworth, 2006) and
should be documented and kept with the other vital records (FEMA, 2009c).
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Continuity Facilities
Continuity facilities are another critical element in the continuity planning
process. The first requirement for an alternate facility is the capability to maintain
essential functions in a threat-free environment (Whitworth, 2006). Safety
considerations such as security measures must be taken into account for those
employees who are being relocated to a new site (FEMA, 2009c). Before
alternate facilities are determined, a risk assessment should be conducted in
order to determine the likelihood of disruptions. Training on relocation
procedures should be offered to all employees. Organizations should also
determine alternate uses for their primary facility as well as considerations for
virtual offices. Continuity facilities can be classified as a “hot site” or a “cold site”
(Whitworth, 2006). The only difference between these two facilities is that the hot
site is fully functional to resume normal operations. The cold site may require
installation of essential equipment before normal operations can be resumed.
Another alternative option for organizations is establishment of agreements with
other businesses to use their facilities in the event of an emergency. In any
case, an inventory of equipment should be recorded with the minimum supplies
consisting of essential equipment for continued operations, water supply,
electricity, communication capabilities, and generators (Whitworth, 2006).
Devolution of Control and Direction
Devolution of control supports the organization when leadership or key
staff personnel are incapable of performing essential functions (FEMA, 2009c).
Devolution, also known as “fail over,” allows for the transfer of essential functions
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from the organization’s primary staff and facilities to other employees and
facilities (Florida Atlantic University Coop Plan, n.d.). FEMA states that the
devolution plan should address notice and no notice events. The planning
should be developed as a means to identify and transfer essential functions to a
safe and secure environment as well as sustain operational capability for an
extended period (FEMA, 2009c). Universities should consider pursuing
agreements with other universities or similar entities as a consideration in
developing their devolution plan (Florida Atlantic University Coop Plan, n.d.).
Continuity Communication
The success of any continuity plan is dependent on effective
communication internally and externally (FEMA, 2009c). All communication tools
should be reliable, redundant, and interoperable until normal operations can be
continued (NFPA, 2010). These capabilities should be used as advisory and
warning systems for employees, stakeholders, emergency responders, and other
pertinent outside entities (NFPA, 2010). All communications should resemble
those capabilities used during day-to-day operations. Secure and non-secure
communications, such as voice systems, video conferencing, information
technology systems, and other messaging systems, must be scrutinized on their
resiliency under various threats and disruptions (FEMA, 2009c).
Vital Records Management
Vital records are simply those files and documents necessary for
performing essential functions (Health and Human Services DRLN, 2007).
FEMA places these vital records into two separate categories: emergency
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operating records and rights and interests records (FEMA, 2009c). Emergency
operating records are simply those records needed to continue essential
functions during an emergency. One of these records is the continuity of
operation plan that includes delegations of authority, staffing assignments, orders
of succession, and so forth. The other category is rights and interests records
which include documents such as payroll, social security, insurance records, and
inventory records. This category focuses on the protection of legal and financial
rights of the organization and its personnel (FEMA, 2009c). All of these records
and databases should be stored in electronic and paper form and be made
accessible to those with responsibilities defined in the plans (Bjelmrot, 2007).
Health and Human Services DRLN (2007) states that these records should be
stored in a fireproof and waterproof environment as well as in multiple locations.
Policies should also be in place for review and updating these records on a
routine basis.
Human Capital
People are one of the most important components in having a continuity
plan. Businesses that fail to focus on the human aspect in creating their BCP
have missed the mark (Ketterer et al., 2007). Saving lives and reducing the
chance of further injuries or deaths during an emergency should be top priority.
People need to know that their well-being is not compromised during an
emergency. Communication is vital during an emergency. Organizations should
have procedures in place that incorporate a process for accounting and
contacting personnel during an emergency as well as a contact number or
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website for the employee to contact the organization during an emergency
(FEMA, 2009c). Other important issues that concern employees are pay, leave,
work scheduling, and staffing. BCPs that are created with the best interest for
the employees have the greatest chance of working (Ketterer et al., 2007).
Test, Training, and Exercise (TT&E) Programs
Test, training, and exercise programs become the fruition of all the
preparatory work put into creating the COOP. This essential element allows the
continuity manager to see the pieces of the puzzle come together. It provides
the organization immediate feedback on the effectiveness of the plan and its
ability to perform essential functions during emergencies (FEMA, 2009c).
Testing is used to ensure that “equipment and procedures are maintained in a
constant state of readiness to support continuity activation and operations”
(FEMA, 2009c, p. K-1). Testing should be conducted at least once a year with
results of the testing documented.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2007a) created a national
standardized program called the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation
Program (HSEEP) which enables exercise planners to create, design, conduct,
and evaluate exercises to improve organizational preparedness. It should be
noted that creating and implementing exercise policies is an evolving process
that will constantly change (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007b).
Continual testing and training will assist in determining these changes.
Flin (1996) suggested multiple ways to evaluate training methods. These
methods are as follows:
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The most common training methods are exercises, simulations, case
studies of major incidents, lectures (on leadership, principles of command,
operational procedures), directed reading (the military favour biographies
of famous commanders, accounts of battles and texts on command), and
on-the-job learning. (p. 70)
These training methods could be divided into two types of categorical
exercise drills: discussion-based and operational-based (Cerullo & Cerullo,
2004). Discussion-based exercises are exercises that utilize the human mind to
process a course of action during various disasters. Beckman (2006) found that
discussion-based exercises are cost-effective compared to operational exercises.
Flin (1996) found that these exercises can range anywhere from directed
readings to tabletop exercises. Some discussion-based exercises, such as
lectures, case studies, and background readings, are used for compilation of
knowledge about a major incident. This knowledge usually comes from a
specialist who has either experienced the incident firsthand or has received a
detailed account of the particular incident (Flin, 1996). These exercise drills are
very useful in formulating an emergency response plan and providing insight on
successful and non-successful scenarios that occurred in the past.
Other training exercises, such as seminars, workshops, and tabletop drills,
are also useful in evaluating the emergency response plan (Flin, 1996). The
tabletop scenario is a specific simulation that usually consists of key personnel,
in supervisory positions, who come together to discuss possible emergency
situations (Lindell, Prater, & Perry, 2007). Any type of emergency is “fair game”
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during these scenarios. Once an emergency topic is chosen, the selected group
will perform a “walk-through” analysis of the scenario. This analysis is to make
certain that everyone knows his or her specific role in responding to the disaster.
These informal discussions are usually a few hours in length and lead to a
reduction of stress among participants (McIntire, 2007).
A drill is a hands-on exercise used for a single-function response
(Beckman, 2006). This exercise is narrow and precise in nature and seeks to
improve a certain function by reducing time and effort during the response and
recovery phase. This small and limited exercise allows for immediate discussion
and feedback. Another advantage of this operational exercise is it only takes a
few hours from start to finish (McIntire, 2007). Another operational exercise is
called a functional exercise. This exercise is sometimes called a control postexercise and consist of small exercises with different entities working together to
accomplish the same task (Bechman, 2006). Unlike drills, functional exercises
can incorporate other agencies in an attempt to control the situation; however,
they are still limited in scope. These exercises also are good for testing of
equipment used in an emergency. Full-scale exercises encompass all agencies
and departments that are deemed necessary to control the situation (McIntire,
2007). These large simulations involve nearly every organization that normally
would be involved in a disaster. It is treated as a real-life situation and involves
multi-agency collaboration. Each participating department can learn numerous
lessons through the use of full-scale exercises. Operational- and discussionbased exercises enable all participants to understand the key functions of ERP.

35
During these exercises participants will assemble and discuss their roles in an
emergency while becoming acquainted with policies and procedures set forth by
the facility’s emergency response plan (McIntire, 2007). Test, training, and
exercises are important for continuity planning. However, most sporting venues
that use these exercises to practice emergency plans and procedures usually are
found in the professional realm with collegiate venues lacking in overall security
measures (Beckman, 2006).
Risk Management
Effective risk management programs are not a regular part of most
colleges and universities (Cassidy et al., 2001); however, hazard mitigation is a
good investment for all higher education institutions (FEMA, 2003). Therefore,
FEMA has collaborated with six universities in order to create an action plan for
building a disaster resistant university. This publication is designed for
institutions that are just getting started in becoming disaster resistant; however, it
also serves to provide a foundation to COOP planning. The document includes
COOP elements but mainly offers ideas and suggestions in the identification of
hazards and risk assessment, organizing and identifying resources, and
developing and implementing a mitigation plan (FEMA, 2003). FEMA has
furnished literature for universities to become disaster resistant and provided
funding opportunities to these universities in order to become compliant in hazard
mitigation planning using the Disaster Resistant University (DRU) model outlined
in Building a Disaster Resistant University (FEMA, 2003). The University of
Southern Mississippi (USM) was one of the public four-year institutions in
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Mississippi that was awarded grant money to provide a safer environment,
protect assets, and ensure continuity of operations. In addition to meeting these
objectives, USM outlined and documented prioritized mitigation strategies that
address both natural and manmade hazards. These mitigation measures include
policy actions, planning initiatives, and physical improvements to address specific
vulnerabilities (USM, 2010). Another tool that has been useful in preparing
colleges and universities for all forms of disasters is the National Campus Safety
and Security Project designed by the National Association of College and
University Business Officers (2008). All these actions are the first steps in COOP
planning but are necessary in achieving COOP capabilities.
Since risk is prevalent in life and cannot be eliminated from the
environment, actions should be taken to minimize the possibility of such losses
resulting from various types of risk (Hall, 2006). In order to manage risk, it is
important to understand the meaning of risk. ASIS International (2003) defines
risk as “the possibility of loss resulting from a threat, security incident, or event”
(p. 5). The NFPA (2007) identified these potential hazards in three categories:
natural hazards, human-caused events, and technological-caused events.
Natural hazards are those hazards beyond the control of human vices.
These hazards include geological, meteorological, and biological events.
Geological and meteorological hazards include hazards such as earthquakes,
volcanoes, landslides, tsunamis, flash floods, snow storms, lightning strikes,
forest fires, drought, tornados, and hurricanes. Biological events are different in
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that they are epidemic in nature. Examples of these hazards include smallpox,
SARS, BSE, plague, and West Nile virus (NFPA, 2007).
According to FEMA (2009d), during the last 10 years over 550 presidential
disasters in America have resulted from these natural hazards with the majority
falling within the meteorological group (presidential disaster). Presidential
disasters are only declared if the individual state or local government does not
have the capability to provide adequate assistance to those affected by the
disaster (FEMA, 2009d).
Another potential hazard that organizations may experience is within the
scope of humanity. These hazards are human-caused events that occur either
intentionally or accidentally. Examples of these hazards are terrorism, labor
disputes, air pollution, energy failure, explosions, building collapse, and
economic depression (NFPA, 2007).
The last potential hazard category that organizations may experience
comes in the form of technology. These technological-caused events can be
unrelated to natural- or human-caused events. Examples include computer
mainframes, software, telecommunications, and ancillary support equipment
(NFPA, 2007).
Once all risks have been identified, the organization should categorize the
risks by frequency and severity of the hazard. Potential impact and damage to
people, property, operations, and the environment should be considered in the
process. Multiple strategies are used to establish a viable and effective way to
manage risks. A risk management plan must include a comprehensive
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assessment that identifies all potential hazards or threats with clarification on the
magnitude and frequency of these events (Lasecki, 2009). Gallagher’s (2003)
definition seems to emulate many other sources within the current literature.
Gallagher defines risk management as “the process of identifying risks,
evaluating their potential consequences and determining the most effective
methods of controlling them or of responding to them” (p. 8). According to Fried
(2010), risk management focuses on identifying risks and eliminating or reducing
those risks. Ammon (2010) used a similar strategy called the DIM process,
which simply means to develop, implement, and manage the risk management
plan. In order to develop the plan, all risks must be identified and categorized by
relative frequency and severity of the events keeping in mind that the main focus
is to reduce or eliminate the threat or hazard (NFPA, 2007).
The risk management plan must transition to the implementation stage.
This stage requires effective communication with all employees regarding the risk
management process. Each person must understand his or her role for
implementing the plan (Ammon, 2010). Fried (2010) mentioned one way an
organization can assist in the implementation of the risk management plan is
using the ECT approach. This approach uses seven words that end with the
letters ect as an easy-to-remember guideline to follow. These seven elements
consist of reflect, deflect, detect, inspect, correct, reinspect, and reflect. Again,
this process should be cyclical in nature in order to assure best practices are
being implemented.

39
Once implementation is accomplished, the risk management plan must be
managed. Managing the plan is a cyclical process. The risk manager is
responsible for monitoring the plan, conducting inspections, supervising training,
reviewing accidents, and implementing any changes in the process (Ammon,
2010).
Reconstitution
Reconstitution is simply returning back to normal operations and usually
occurs immediately after an event (FEMA, 2009c). Reconstitution plans should
be made regardless of the level of disruption caused by the event. It should
include instructions for a safe and orderly return to the primary facility. It can
coincide with recovery and restoration procedures. A prioritized approach to
returning to normal business operations and an examination of the facility to
make sure it is safe and operable for employees should be included in the plan.
Once the facility is determined safe and operable, a checklist of essential
equipment or other essential items that allow the organization to function should
be prioritized and completed with communication of completion directed to a
central location or a specified individual (FEMA, 2009c). While this process is
underway, essential functions should be maintained either from the alternate site
or primary facility until the facility is ready for the transfer.
Program Plans and Procedures
In order for BCM to be effective, it must align with the organization’s
mission statement (Freestone & Lee, 2007). An organization must be capable of
responding to a continuity incident or event at a given time (FEMA, 2009c). One
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way to achieve this readiness capability is by embedding BCM into the
organization’s culture (Freestone & Lee, 2007). However, if BCM is going to
become part of the organization’s culture, leadership must be the driving force
behind it (Karakasidis, 1977). Training and awareness programs that include
BCM training for new and existing staff should be offered on a regular basis in
order for staff to become familiar with all aspects of the plan. Staff should be
familiar with the location of the alternate continuity facility (Freestone & Lee,
2007). Plans and procedures for activating the BCP should be well-defined and
include instructions for moving to the alternate facility, moving vital records,
acquiring necessary supplies, and notifying appropriate personnel (FEMA,
2009c).
Budgeting and Acquisition of Resources
Budgeting for COOP planning is a difficult task and must go through the
planning process in order to ensure continuity resources are available during a
crisis (FEMA, 2009c). Companies must identify all supporting requirements
necessary to implement an effective continuity program. Some of these
supporting requirements consist of people, supplies, communications, facilities,
technology, infrastructure, and transportation. During the planning stage, the
organization needs to identify and prioritize the allocation of budgetary resources
with a plan for utilizing these resources on an emergency basis. The
development of a multiyear strategy or budgeting plan may be used as a means
to meet budgetary requirements, such as acquiring, equipping, maintaining, and
improving the prioritized needs of the organization (FEMA, 2001). This
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budgetary plan also considers the costs associated with continuity test, training,
and exercise activities (FEMA, 2009c).
NCAA Division 1 Studies
Even though literature is lacking concerning COOP in collegiate athletic
departments, multiple studies have been conducted on certain continuity
elements at Division 1 athletic departments that have led the author to suspect
that COOP planning may be needed in collegiate athletic departments. The
following studies have focused on emergency preparedness and planning at
NCAA Division 1 schools and universities.
Beckman (2006) studied awareness and perceptions of emergency
responders that may be used in the event of an emergency at a Division 1A
football game. Beckman simulated a tabletop exercise by using 27 participants
including representation from agencies such as the institution’s athletic
department, AAA ambulance, university police, American Red Cross, police
department, fire department, State Health Department, State Department of
Homeland Security, Emergency Management, and other Institutional decision
makers responsible for emergency response. The participants were required to
attend a four-hour tabletop session and take a pretest and posttest. The
questionnaire asked 18 statements regarding awareness and perceptions of
emergency response training, agency and interagency roles and responsibilities
during an emergency, and the attractiveness of Division 1 A collegiate stadiums
as a terrorist target. Participants of the study were given the institution’s
emergency action plan to assess its effectiveness during the exercise; however,
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many of the responders indicated that they were not familiar with the plan.
Overall, this study revealed a lack of testing and training programs in Division 1
athletic departments.
Cunningham (2007) surveyed 238 athletic administrators from 119
Division 1A football athletic departments to determine perceived capabilities in
regard to event security management. Questions from the survey incorporated
themes such as emergency evacuation planning, emergency management,
security policies, agency collaboration, credential control, perimeter control,
liability, and spectator control. According to Cunningham, each of these themes
is needed for effective security event management. Participation in the study
was limited to 40% (n = 81) of the administrators responsible for game day
security. Of these respondents, 60% had no formal training or education in event
security management. Cunningham (2007) is not the only study that reveals
weaknesses in athletic department preparedness. Baker, Connaughton, Zhang,
and Spengler (2007) investigated risk management measures implemented after
September 11, 2001, in regard to terrorism. Baker et al. surveyed football
stadium managers for all NCAA Division 1A football stadiums. As a result, the
study revealed 47% of participants had never received terrorism-related training.
One positive statistic that evolved through the study was 87% of football
stadiums had emergency action plans and these plans are reviewed at least
annually. However, even though these institutions are compliant with literature
recommendations, they fail miserably in providing training. Baker et.al. (2007)
reported that only 25% of these institutions have emergency action plans,
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actually practice mock or simulated attacks, and only 13% provide formal training
to their staff regarding terrorism training. Other researchers, such as Pantera et
al. (2003), continue to confirm similar findings in regard to training preparedness
in athletic venues. These studies reveal a major need for schools to train their
staff and personnel on how to effectively respond to an emergency.
A survey of lightning policies was conducted at 48 Division 1 football
institutions from Florida, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania
and concluded that only 8% (n = 4) of these institutions have a written lightning
policy (Walsh, Hanley, Graner, Beam, & Bazluki, 1997). These particular states
were selected for the study because they ranked in the top 5 for combined
injuries and deaths in a 35-year timeframe which correlates to 31% of the 13,012
reported injuries and deaths from lightning in the United States. Gratz, Church,
and Noble (2004) conducted a similar study of Division 1 football stadiums in an
attempt to promote lightning safety policies at these large stadiums. Gratz et al.
reported an 18% increase in college football attendance from nearly 29.3 million
to over 34.6 million from the four years starting in 2000-2003. “Lightning is the
most dangerous weather hazard that people encounter each year” (Gratz et al.,
2004, p. 3), and stadiums are continually increasing in total attendance at football
games nearly every year. Therefore, institutions should consider the safety of
spectators if and when lightning strikes their stadiums.
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Potential Hazards
Inclement Weather
Normal operations can be effected by all types of potential hazards.
Natural hazards such as hurricanes, floods, and tornados are usually the culprits
that cause most of the disruptions of normal operations. Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita catapulted the awareness for the need of COOP planning in higher
education and athletic departments. After Katrina, students from at least 12
colleges and universities were displaced around the country waiting for direction
from their institution on what to do next. Even before this major disaster
occurred, literature concluded that institutions were not prepared for such an
event. For example, Henderson (2005) stated that schools and universities were
focusing more on emergency action plans than on continuity planning.
Wolverton (2005) found that many institutions have crisis management plans;
however, these plans do not account for major disasters that displace athletes or
cause cancellations in athletic events. Wolverton quotes the Commissioner of
the Sunbelt Conference as saying that “[c]onferences and teams make plans for
if it rains, but we don’t plan much beyond that” (p. 37). However, despite the lack
of preparedness, Tulane University became an example to the other institutions
by the way it communicated to its students. The university’s president, Scott S.
Cowen, posted a blog on Tulane’s website that informed faculty, staff, and
students of the progress that was being made on behalf of those involved. After
it was apparent that the university would remain closed at least though the fall
semester, he focused on getting help for the students. On September 1, 2005,
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he was able to speak with representatives from the American Council on
Education, the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant
Colleges, and the American Association of State Colleges and Universities.
Later that day, a conference call was held to discuss how other universities
around the country could provide assistance to the students at Tulane. These
accrediting bodies of Higher Education along with the American Association of
Community Colleges, the Council of Independent Colleges, and the Association
of Jesuit Colleges and Universities made a decision to allow currently paid
students to attend their respective institutions without charge for tuition.
Provisions for student athletes were also included in the plan. Cowen made
clear that the athletic program was an integral part of reestablishing its program.
Cowen (2005) stated that “we want our athletes to carry the torch, face, and
name of Tulane University during this difficult time” (p.1). However, even though
the financial aspect was covered for athletics, other problems arose. Some
examples of the chaotic havoc that took place in the athletic department at
Tulane were occurring at other institutions as well. For instance, Tulane’s
football team, by way of Houston, ended up at Louisiana Tech, the golf teams
went to Southern Methodist University, Texas A & M hosted the men’s basketball
and tennis team along with the women’s volleyball, soccer, tennis, and swimming
and diving teams. Texas Tech hosted the baseball team and women’s
basketball team. Many of the nonathletic students were sent to Jackson State
University during the evacuation but were allowed to attend other schools of their
choice until the Tulane resumed normal operations (Wolverton, 2005). Many of
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these logistical problems could have been prevented through proper planning
(Fried, 2010).
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita are just two of the many examples found in
the body of literature of where inclement weather has caused havoc upon athletic
departments. For example, in 2010, the Iowa State Cyclones closed multiple
parking lots for the opening football game due to summer flooding (“Parking for
First Iowa State Football Game Impacted by Flooding,” 2010). Even though the
flooding did not impact the game itself, it caused loss of revenues for the facility
as well as last minute planning to redirect traffic to other parking lots. Multiple
tailgaters were forced to leave their recreational vehicles at home due to lack of
parking space. In 2008, a tornado ripped a hole in the Georgia Dome roof where
the Southeastern Conference men’s basketball tournament was being played.
The tournament had to be postponed and moved to a smaller stadium across
town with the only fans being immediate family members of the players and the
schools’ band members and cheerleaders (Dougherty, 2010). In 2002 a tornado
blasted through the Mississippi University for Women’s (MUW) campus causing
significant damage to multiple buildings with one building being completely
destroyed. Other damages caused by this tornado included loss of power lines,
destroyed cars, and multiple shattered windows on campus. Fortunately, no
deaths occurred on campus (MUW, 2002). Hurricane Camille caused
catastrophic damage to the USM’s Gulf Coast Research Lab in 1969 (USM,
2010). An unusual amount of heavy snow in Britain caused thousands of
schools to close and forced the cancellation of multiple sporting events including
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the postponement of two League Cup soccer games (“Britain Blasted by Heavy
Snow,” 2010). During the Vancouver Olympics in Canada, the first official
training run was canceled for women’s downhill skiing due to dense fog
(“Vancouver Olympics Cancel Trial Run,” 2010). Many other problems that arose
at the Vancouver Olympics can be attributed to an unusual rise in temperatures
and the lack of snow and ice (“Vancouver Olympics Unusual Temperatures,”
2010). Broom (cited in “Vancouver Olympics Unusual Temperatures,” 2010)
reported that over 28,000 tickets were canceled due to the weather and
represented a revenue loss of $1.5 million. Even though multiple hours of time
and effort were put into making Canada shine during this worldwide event, the
lack of cooperation in weather had the opposite effect.
Biological Hazards
Inclement weather, such as hurricanes, floods, and tornados, are not the
only culprits that cause disruptions of normal operations. Other natural hazards
have been documented to have the same effect on day-to-day operations.
Concerning biological natural hazards in Manila, Philippines, the Commission of
Higher Education postponed college classes because of an H1N1 threat (Tan,
2009). The same thing happened in Alabama when Stillman College had to
cancel a football game due to fears created by H1N1 virus (“Alabama College
Forfeits Football Game Due to H1N1 Fears,” 2009). However, even this type of
disaster is not new to athletics. In 1989, Siena campus experienced a measles
outbreak which caused several basketball games including the North Atlantic
Conference Tournament to be quarantined (Siena Saints, 2011).
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Human Hazards
Another common type of hazard which has caused havoc in the university
and sporting realm are human-caused events. Included in these events are the
publicized shootings that occurred at Alabama, Virginia Tech, and more recently
at the University of Texas. Terrorism also is included under human-caused
events and has become a force to be reckoned with. Barbisch (2005) stated
that, “The objective in terrorism is to create destruction and chaos that result in
feelings of overwhelming fear and vulnerability for those under attack” (p. 77).
Since the attacks of 9/11, America has finally comprehended the imminent
danger that terrorists pose to this country. Even though these attacks were not
the first terrorist attacks in America, they were the most powerful in their effects
(Johnson, 2005). It is an extremely hard task to fight against terrorism because
terrorists do not value human life and they are willing to sacrifice themselves in
order to reach their objective. Terrorism is unpredictable because not all
terrorists need a purpose or an objective to commit an act of violence (Johnson,
2005). In October 2005 a student from the University of Oklahoma committed
suicide by detonating a 3-pound bomb 200 yards from Memorial Stadium
(Gardiner, 2006). This same student reportedly tried to get in the facility two
times but was stopped by security in order to check his backpack. The student
then fled to a tree where the explosives detonated possibly unintentionally. It
was ruled a suicide but no one is positive that it was not an attempted terrorist
attack (Faulk, 2005). The National Football League Commissioner Roger
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Goodell stated that sports-packed stadiums pose a real risk for terrorism.
Goodell stated that
We have to remain vigilant and our efforts must be geared toward an
aggressive position to keep attacks from happening at our sporting events.
Because if it happens in another stadium, then it will affect us all. We have
to make sure that our fans come to games, feel comfortable about being
there and know that they will be safe. (p. 2)
Hall et al. (2007) reported that suicide terrorism is an effective way to
achieve the goal of mass casualties and mass humiliation. Hall et al. continue to
contend that it is impossible to ensure human-caused events do not occur;
therefore, it is imperative that organizations prepare, respond, and recover for
these types of emergencies.
Terrorism is only one example of human-caused hazards that disrupt
sporting events. Other examples of hazards that have caused problems at
sporting events are malfunctions in equipment or supplies. For example, a minor
league baseball team experienced a malfunction in its firework display causing
fans to run for safety and injuring two people (“Firework Malfunction,” 2010).
Technological Hazards
Escalators are another potential problem at sporting events. There are
nearly 6,000 escalator-related injuries reported at emergency rooms throughout
the United States each year (“Scottrade Accident is Probed,” 2010). However,
no matter what causes the disruption, institutions need to be prepared.
According to Fried (2010), “Safety is the most important element for any facility”
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(p. 299). The National Collegiate Athletic Association (2010) echoes Fried by
stating that “it is the responsibility of each member institution to protect the health
of and provide a safe environment for each of its participating student-athletes”
(p. 3). Customers and consumers need to know that facilities are prepared to
handle a worst case scenario (Fried, 2010). Forseeability is essential for proper
security management. Nearly every facility will have some security concerns, but
proper planning can prevent many of these security and safety problems
experienced in the past (Fried, 2010).
Conclusion
There are multiple definitions and approaches to business continuity
planning. Most researchers’ definitions agree that BCP is an “ongoing process
supported by senior management and funded to ensure that the necessary steps
are taken to identify the impact of potential losses, maintain viable recovery
strategies, recovery plans, and continuity of services” (NFPA, 2010, p. 4).
Natural disasters and terrorism continue to pose serious threats on
organizations; therefore, businesses must become proactive in preparing for the
unexpected (Wheatman, 2001). An all-hazard approach prepares organizations
for any disruptive event by identifying all potential threats that may disrupt normal
operations (Whitworth, 2006).
Collegiate athletic departments face the same threats of private and public
businesses. Multiple disruptive events have caused havoc at various athletic
events causing change of venues, loss of revenue, injuries, and deaths. In order
to combat against these disruptive events and provide a safe environment for
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everyone, athletic departments must be proactive in assuring that necessary
steps are implemented to maintain normal operations. Creating, implementing,
and practicing continuity of operation planning reduces the chaos caused by
disruptive events and expedites the process of returning to normal operations.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
This chapter provides an overview of the methods and procedures used to
examine continuity of operations planning preparedness of the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division 1 athletic departments. The
chapter outlines the research design, participants, instrumentation, procedures,
and data analysis used in this research process.
Research Design
For this study, a quantitative descriptive methodology design was used to
examine the level of continuity of operations planning preparedness in collegiate
athletic departments. The independent variables included information regarding
demographics of schools, such as student enrollment, conference affiliation, type
of institution, total athletic budget, and the occurrence of a presidential declared
disaster. The dependent variable was the overall score analyzed from the
questions located in the Athletic Department Survey of Continuity of Operation
Planning Preparedness. Questions were formulated to encapsulate the ten
elements of a viable continuity capability and the four supporting components of
a continuity program foundation taken from the Continuity Assistance Tool (CAT)
for Non-Federal Entities and the Continuity Guidance for Non-Federal Entities
(FEMA, 2009a; FEMA, 2009c). Continuity planning is a fundamental
responsibility of public and private entities; therefore, it is highly recommended
that athletic departments reinforce their compliance with federal government
guidelines and recommendations (FEMA, 2009c).
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Participants
The aim of this study is to examine continuity of operations planning
preparedness of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division 1
athletic departments. The researcher will use a stratified, voluntary sample of
senior, associate, and assistant athletic directors, and facility directors from
NCAA Division 1 athletic programs nationwide. All NCAA Division 1 schools
listed in 2008-2009 data from the U.S. Department of Education (2008-2009)
were asked to voluntarily participate in this study.
Instrumentation
A questionnaire was developed by the researcher to examine athletic
departments’ level of preparedness in regard to continuity planning
preparedness. The survey was created through a process of researching
relevant literature, revisions and recommendations from an expert panel,
utilization of a focus group, content validity testing, and modifications and
revisions of the preliminary scale. The survey consisted of Part I: Athletic
Department Survey of Continuity of Operation Planning Preparedness and Part
II: Demographics.
Part I: Athletic Department Survey of Continuity of Operation Planning
Preparedness contains 42 questions derived from the 10 elements of a viable
continuity capability and 4 supporting components outlined in the Continuity
Guidance for Non-Federal Entities (FEMA, 2009c). The elements and
components include the following: (a) essential functions; (b) orders of
succession; (c) delegation of authority; (d) continuity facilities; (e) continuity
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communications; (f) vital records management; (g) human capital; (h) test,
training, and exercise programs; (i) devolution of control and direction; (j)
reconstitution operations; (k) program plans and procedures; (l) risk
management; (m) budgeting and acquisition of resources; and (n) continuity plan
operational phases and implementation. Questions specifically regarding
program plans and procedures were not created because of major similarities in
the other elements and components. Two other supporting measurement tools
that clarified and explained these elements and components was found in the
Continuity Assistant tools for Non-Federal entities (CAT) (FEMA, 2009a) and the
Continuity Evaluation Tool Measurement (FEMA, 2009b). All three of these
publications were created by the United States Department of Homeland Security
in compliance with multiple authorities such as the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan, the National Incident Management System (NIMS), Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 1, and the National Exercise Program
Implementation Plan (FEMA, 2009a; FEMA, 2009b; FEMA, 2009c). These
elements and components are prevalent in the literature; however, most sources
rarely use the same 14 components as a standard for COOP. Multiple ideas on
which components should be included in continuity planning vary throughout the
literature. For instance, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) (2010)
compares its criteria for continuity of operation planning programs with the
Disaster Recovery Institute International (DRII) Professional Practices for
Business Continuity Practitioners and the Canadian Standards Association
(CSA) Z1600-08 Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs.
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Other sources shared similar components in continuity of operation planning
such as The ASIS General Security Risk Assessment Guideline (2003) and the
Good Practice Guidelines 2008 (BCI, 2007). The researcher used FEMA’s
elements and components because FEMA’s continuity of operations program
“provides the foundation for the nation’s first Essential Function, Enduring
Constitutional Government, and the foundation for the tiers of the National
Response Framework, operational governments at all levels-local, State, and
Federal-capable of performing their essential functions, under all conditions”
(FEMA, 2010a, para.1). FEMA is the governing body responsible for ensuring
that all federal agencies have a comprehensive and effective program in place in
order that essential Federal functions are maintained under all hazards and
circumstances (FEMA, 2001). This responsibility includes coordinating “the
federal government’s role in preparing for, preventing, mitigating the effects of,
responding to, and recovering from all domestic disasters, whether natural or
man-made, including acts of terrors” (FEMA, 2010c, para.1). Also, a primary
goal of FEMA is to support colleges and universities by helping create an
emergency management system capable to sustain continuity of operations by
taking an all-hazard approach (FEMA, 2010b). Questions from the Athletic
Department Survey of Continuity of Operation Planning Preparedness were
assessed using a 5-point Likert scale with 1 being No Progress, 2 being Limited
Progress, 3 being Moderate Progress, 4 being Substantial Progress and 5 being
Objective Achieved. These five categories came from the task rating criteria
listed in the Continuity Evaluation Tool: Version 7 (FEMA, 2009b). The
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researcher used task rating criteria to define the categories. The categories are
defined as: 1. no progress has been made toward achieving the identified
continuity requirement; 2. preliminary efforts have been initiated such as plans to
develop this aspect of the capability; 3. significant efforts are underway but
important gaps remain; 4. Efforts in this area are established and mature with few
non-significant gaps; 5. Requirement is fully achieved with regard to this
capability.
Part II: Demographics will include school name, conference affiliation of
school, location of school, number of students enrolled at school, athletic budget,
orientation of school (private or public), and whether the school has experienced
a presidential disaster declaration within the last 10 years. A presidential
disaster declaration will be defined as an institution receiving federal funding due
to a disaster. The student body and the athletic budget will consist of four
categories based on quartile percentages calculated from NCAA Division 1
schools using figures from 2009 equity in athletics data retrieved from the U.S.
Department of Education (2008-2009). The student categories are < 5,000,
5,001 to 10,000, 10,001 to 15,000, and > 15,000. The athletic budget categories
are < $9,500,000, $9,500,000 to $14,500,000, $14,500,001 to $27,000,000, and
> $27,000,000.
Procedures
The Athletic Department Survey of Continuity of Operation Planning
Preparedness was created by using FEMA’s guidelines for COOP. The
researcher used the 10 elements of a viable continuity capability and 4
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supporting components outlined in the Continuity Guidance for Non-Federal
Entities (FEMA, 2009c) as the foundation for the creation of the questions listed
in the Athletic Department Survey of Continuity of Operation Planning
Preparedness. Once the instrument was formed, it went through content and
face validity measures using a focus group and a panel of experts to determine
relevance, clarity, appropriateness, and other issues regarding the nature of the
instrumentation (Krueger, 1998). Face validity measures determined if the
reading level was appropriate to respondents and if wording could be obtrusive
toward any particular subgroup. Content measures determined those items that
were redundant, poorly worded, or simply needed to be deleted (Churchill, 1979).
Content validity was derived from a systematic and technical analysis of the test
content. Hopkins (1998) defined content validity as “the degree to which the
items of that test are a representative sample of the content universe or behavior
of the domain being assessed” (p. 77). The expert panel consisted of an
emergency and fire safety coordinator from the Institution of Higher Education
Board, a flood plan development officer from city government, an assistant facility
director from an NCAA Division 1 university, and an assistant vice president of
information systems from a community bank. Each person had training and
experience in continuity of operation planning (COOP). Some of their specialty
training was more specific to certain areas, but all of these personnel helped plan
and train employees in COOP procedures.
Feedback was assessed and the instrument was refined. Approval from
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) was requested to distribute the survey to
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participants by using an electronic version or a mailed version. Once permission
was granted from IRB, a pilot study was conducted using senior, associate, and
assistant athletic directors and facility directors of universities and colleges who
are classified as a NCAA Division II school. The researcher selected one private
and one public institution, with the largest student body, from each of the 10
regions specified by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to
participate in the pilot study (2010d). Selection of these institutions was based
on the information from the 2009 equity in athletics data retrieved from the U.S.
Department of Education (2008-2009). Regions that failed to meet these specific
requirements and non-respondents to the surveys were replaced by other similar
institutions. A projected sample of at least 12 participants was selected to
participate in the pilot study. The researcher trained an assistant to help with the
data collection. This assistant was used to collect the participants’ names and
email addresses for the pilot study. Contact information was retrieved from the
2009-2010 National Directory of College Athletics publication (NACDA, 2009),
the institution’s athletic website, or by calling the institution’s athletic department.
Once the individual responsible for COOP in the athletic department was
identified, the researcher or assistant informed him or her about the study via
email and ask for voluntary participation. The email consisted of the online
hyperlink to the survey, a voluntary participation statement, IRB approval
statement, and the researcher’s contact information. The questionnaire was
administered by using an online measuring tool called Survey Monkey.
Completion of the survey took approximately ten to fifteen minutes. Once the
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email was sent, the researcher gave the participants two working days to fill out
the questionnaire. After two working days passed, a follow-up email was sent
reminding them about the survey. After two more working days passed, the
researcher assumed that the participant has declined to participate in the pilot
study and other similar institutions were contacted to take the place of the
declined participant.
The minimum numbers of surveys (n=10) were completed and the data
was entered into SPSS for analyses. The purpose of this pilot study was to
further understand the face validity of the instrument from the perceptive of a
similar population and determine the internal consistency by measuring the
Cronbach alpha statistic which should exceed .70 to meet reliability requirements
(Cronbach, 1951).
The pilot study was completed and analyzed. The researcher dropped 16
questions from the original survey due to multiple responders failing to complete
the entire survey. Once these questions were dropped, an analysis on the final
26 questions was run using SPSS. The Cronbach alpha statistic score of .985
was more than acceptable to send the survey to the targeted participants.
Procedures for the targeted participants were similar to the pilot study. Approval
from the Institutional Review Board was obtained to conduct the study. The
researcher collected the participants’ names and email addresses from the 20092010 National Directory of College Athletics publication (NACDA, 2009), the
institution’s athletic website, or by calling the institution’s athletic department.
Once the individual responsible for COOP in the athletic department was
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identified, the researcher informed him or her about the study via email. An
email, from the researcher’s email address, was sent to those participants
(n=344) informing him or her about the study via email and asking for voluntary
participation. The email consisted of the online hyperlink to the survey, a
voluntary participation statement, an IRB approval statement, a rational
statement for the study, and the researcher’s contact information. Step-by-step
directions were in the email as a means to access the online hyperlink to the
survey. The survey was administered by utilizing an online measuring tool called
Survey Monkey. This online measuring tool has security features that provide
assurance to the participants that confidentiality was maintained. Only the
researcher and advisor had the login information and password needed to
access the material. All other confidential materials were stored in a locked filing
cabinet or a password coded computer. Participants can expect the survey to
take approximately five to ten minutes to complete. The researcher gave the
participants two working days after the initial email was sent, to fill out the
questionnaire. Once two working days passed, a follow-up email was sent
reminding them about the survey. After seven working days passed, the
researcher sent a final email allowing the participants one last chance to respond
to the survey. The researcher then closed the survey to compile all the
completed surveys to review the response rate. The response rate was not
considerably lower than the approximated 30% (N=103), so the researcher did
not send a mailed copy of the survey to those participants who failed to
participate in the study using the online version A sufficient number of surveys
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(N=91) were completed and the data was entered into SPSS version 16.0 for
analyses (SPSS, 2007).
Data Analysis
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to analyze H1 through H6 with the
level of significance at p < .05. Tukey’s HSD tests will be used to follow up on
any significant ANOVA’s found within the hypotheses. The researcher
determined how to deal with missing data on the Athletic Department Survey of
Continuity of Operation Planning Preparedness once the surveys were
completed. The researcher expected approximately a 34.4% return rate of
completed surveys (N=100). Descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations,
and frequencies) were also used to analyze the demographic variables and
hypotheses. SPSS (Version 18) was used to conduct the data analysis.
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CHAPTER IV
STUDY ONE
CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS PLANNING PREPAREDNESS
OF NCAA DIVISION 1 ATHLETIC DEPARTMENTS
Introduction
Disasters and emergencies happen! Ketterer et al. (2007) associated the
phrase “decade of disaster” in an attempt to adequately portray the first 10 years
of the 21st century. In order to support this claim, Ketterer et al. used data from
the emergency management database, which declared that the top three
disasters according to number of deaths in 2005 were Pakistan, Guatemala, and
the United States. The report continued to list the countries that suffered the
most natural disasters in 2005 by listing the Republic of China with 31, India with
30, and the United States with 16. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) reported that within the last 10 years there have been over 560
presidential disaster declarations in every region of the United States (FEMA,
2010f). This means the disaster was beyond the capability of the state and local
government to respond; therefore, federal funding was granted for appropriate
response and recovery (FEMA, 2010g). In 2010, there were 81 major federal
disaster declarations across the United States (FEMA, 2010e). To reiterate the
severity of these threats, Henderson (2005) stated that 80% of the states within
the United States are at risk for earthquake damage. Henderson also says that
10% of the United States land area is subject to flooding. FEMA (2009c)
continues to stress the importance of these plans by stating that
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Today’s changing threat environment and the potential for no-notice
emergencies, including localized acts of nature, accidents,
technological system failures, and military or terrorist attack-related
incidents, have increased the need for continuity capabilities and
planning across all levels of government and the private sector. ( p. 2)
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) supports the idea
that public and private organizations should provide continuity plans which allows
for performance of essential functions during any disruption of normal operations.
It views these plans as a basic entitlement to the nation’s citizens (2009a).
Colleges and universities are no exception to the rule. After Hurricane Katrina in
2005, students from at least 12 colleges and universities were displaced and
relocated to other areas in the country waiting for direction from their institution
on what to do next (Wolverton, 2005). Some examples of the chaotic havoc
which took place in the athletic department at Tulane also occurred at other
institutions. For instance, Tulane’s football team, by way of Houston, ended up
at Louisiana Tech; the golf teams went to Southern Methodist University; and
Texas A & M hosted the men’s basketball and tennis team along with the
women’s volleyball, soccer, tennis, and swimming and diving teams. Texas Tech
hosted the baseball team and women’s basketball team. Many of the nonathletic
students were sent to Jackson State University during the evacuation but were
allowed to attend other schools of their choice until Tulane resumed normal
operations (Wolverton, 2005). Many of these logistical problems could have
been prevented through proper planning (Fried, 2010).
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Continuity planning is necessary to combat all threats including weather,
crowd management, and terrorism. Hall, Marciani, and Cooper (2008) shed light
on the potential of sport venues as terrorist targets. For example, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) posted warnings that reported some terrorist groups
were downloading stadium images. The downloading of this information
supports the tactics of these terrorist groups by targeting large groups of people
in one place. There are multiple examples of unexpected events that have
closed down normal operations in athletic organizations from little league to
professional teams. Therefore, continuity planning is critical in order to assure
that all institutions maintain normal operations if or when an unexpected event
occurs (e.g. weather, crowd control, or terrorism).
Previous studies regarding specific elements of continuity of operations
planning have been conducted at numerous NCAA Division 1 athletic
departments (Baker, Connaughton, Zhang, & Spengler, 2007; Beckman, 2006;
Cunningham, 2007; Gratz, Church, & Noble, 2004; Hall, 2006; Walsh, Hanley,
Graner, Beam, & Bazluki, 1997). These studies revealed weaknesses and flaws
in athletic departments’ policies and procedures in regards to risk management,
emergency management, emergency preparedness, training preparedness, and
emergency action policies and plans. Even though the previous studies allude to
the fact that athletic departments are lacking concerning various elements in
COOP, research is lacking concerning COOP as a whole in collegiate athlete
departments. Therefore, the primary focus of this study was to assess the level
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of preparedness in regards to continuity of operation planning of athletic
departments at NCAA Division 1 colleges and universities.
The following hypotheses were used to guide this study:
H1 : There will be no significant difference in the level of preparedness
among athletic programs based on geographical locations of the 10
regions declared by FEMA.
H2 : There will be no significant difference in the level of preparedness
among athletic programs based on membership in a conference.
H3 : There will be no significant difference in the level of preparedness
among athletic programs based on the number of students enrolled at the
institution.
H4: There will be no significant difference in the level of preparedness
among athletic programs based on a presidential declared disaster
occurring within the last 10 years.
H5: There will be no significant difference in the level of preparedness
among athletic programs based on athletic budget.
H6: There will be no significant difference in the level of preparedness
among athletic programs based on type of institution (public or private).
Review of Related Literature
Continuity of Operations Planning
Because of the changing threat of environment and recent emergencies,
the need for continuity of operation planning capabilities has become more
prevalent in agencies and public institutions (Shaw & Harrald, 2004). All
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organizations face the possibility of disruptive events affecting normal operations
in some capacity; therefore, organizations have used functions such as risk
management, emergency response, and contingency planning as a means to
mitigate relevant threats to their environment (Shaw & Harrald, 2004). One way
these facilities can combat against these threats of disasters is through
preparedness (Waugh, 2000). McIntire (2007) defined disasters “as deadly,
destructive, and disruptive events that occur when a hazard interacts (or multiple
hazards interact) with human vulnerability” (p. 2). Taking this definition at face
value means that even a threat could be considered a disaster if it causes an
event to be disrupted. The threat in and of itself is considered a hazard and
cannot cause a catastrophe until it is carried out.
The National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan and the National
Security Presidential Directive 51/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 20
define continuity of operation planning (COOP) as “an effort within individual
executive departments and agencies to ensure that Primary Mission Essential
Functions (PMEFs) continue to be performed during a wide range of
emergencies, including localized acts of nature, accidents, and technological or
attack-related emergencies” (Petersen, 2007, p. 3). These primary essential
functions are a subset of the mission essential functions which must be
performed continuously uninterrupted or resumed within 12 hours after an event
(FEMA, 2009c). Both mission essential functions and primary essential functions
provide the organization the ability to maintain the safety of the public, provide
vital services, and sustain the economic base in case of a disruption of normal
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operations (FEMA, 2009c). The United States policy regarding all federal
agencies is to have an effective and comprehensive continuity plan in place
(FEMA, 2001). During President Ronald Reagan’s years of service in the oval
office, he passed Executive Order 12656 which assures continuity of
government. This order mandates that all levels of government should have
sufficient capabilities to withstand an emergency regardless of nature (Executive
Order No. 12656, 1988). As an enforcement measure, Presidential Declaration
Directive 67 empowered FEMA with the responsibility of assuring compliance
across the Federal Executive Branch in regard to developing, executing,
facilitating, overseeing, and accessing the status of COOP capabilities (FEMA,
2001). FEMA has played a significant role in COOP in the governmental sector
and devoted itself to assisting and preparing other entities in COOP by providing
financial resources and relevant literature specific to each type of organization
(FEMA, 2003; FEMA, 2009c; FEMA, 2009e).
Recent events from this decade, starting with the devastating effects of
September 11, 2001, have reinforced the need for businesses to consider and
put in place continuity capabilities and planning (Barbara, 2006; Whitworth,
2006). Again, eighty percent of all states within the United States are at risk for
earthquake damage with 10 percent of these states subject to flooding
(Henderson, 2005). Therefore, “Continuity cannot be an afterthought for
organizations as they strive to perform their essential functions” (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 2).

68
COOP, commonly called business continuity planning (BCP) in the private
sector, seeks to recover from all hazards that may pose a threat to the primary
essential functions of the organization. These threats could come from natural
disasters, such as fires or floods, but they could also resemble the form of
unethical operations or the collapse of a key supplier (Gallagher, 2003).
Dunaway (2010) reported the two key factors that determine the adoption of
continuity planning measures for private organizations are the size of the
organization and previous experience with a disaster. The data, retrieved from
145 businesses, industries, and non-profit organizations, revealed four factors
that could influence an organization to reconsider its need for COOP planning.
Dunaway (2010) identified these factors as follows:
1. Geographic proximity (exposure): the physical proximity or exposure
of a private sector entity to hazards or threats that affect the
organization and its environment.
2. Temporal proximity (experience): whether, and if so, how recently a
private sector entity had experience with a disaster or emergency that
affected the organization.
3. Proximity of capability (capability): whether the private sector entity has
at hand the capability to manage a threat to its viability assessed as a
function of the entity’s size.
4. Organizational proximity (collaboration): whether or not the private
sector entity participates in a collaborative organization for regional
emergency planning and preparedness. (p. 126)
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In 2007, the Chartered Management Institute and the Civil Contingencies
Secretariat completed the eighth survey on BCM since 1999 (Woodman, 2007).
From the 10,600 institute members surveyed, a total of 1,257 responded.
Woodman (2007) compiled and presented the research which addressed a wide
range of threats that companies encounter across the United Kingdom. In the
study, Woodman (2007) identified proximity of capability as a factor in
businesses having a BCP in place, and large organizations (over 250
employees) are more likely to have BCPs than small or medium organizations.
The size of the organization supported Dunaway’s (2010) research as a key
factor in determining BCP. Woodman (2007) also stated that BCPs are more
common in the public sector than in private or not-for-profit organizations. This
finding by Woodman may be due to mandates by the Civil Contingencies Act on
public sector organizations. Interestingly, Woodman (2007) lists construction and
education at the bottom for those companies having BCPs.
Previous experience with a disaster has proved to be an ineffective means
to assure COOP planning simply because many organizations cease to exist
after a disaster. According to Gallagher (2003), 40% of enterprises that
experience a disaster close their doors within five years. Cerullo and Cerullo
(2004) cited a similar finding that 43% of companies never reopen and another
29% fail within two years after such a disaster. Runyan and Huddleston (2009)
interviewed small business owners and local officials from the Gulf Coast after
Hurricane Katrina and found that they did not plan for disasters and were having
difficulties recovering from the impact of Katrina. Therefore, COOP planning
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must be integrated before a disaster. The highest level of management must
brainstorm all potential threats to organizations and make plans for combating
these hazards (FEMA, 2009c).
Key considerations in reducing organizational failure include assuring
continuous performance of essential functions, protecting essential facilities,
reducing loss of life, and achieving an orderly and timely recovery from an
emergency (FEMA, 1999). The Health and Human Services Disaster Recovery
Leadership Network (DRLN) of Pinellas County (2007) addressed the complexity
of creating a COOP and stated the following:
Developing a COOP requires forethought, flexibility, and more than a little
fearlessness. It means spending considerable time, effort and possibly
some money anticipating worst-possible scenarios. It means preparing,
even practicing, for a major disaster’s impact on every aspect of business,
community, and life as we typically know it. It means recognizing that
some of your organization’s most severe losses will occur after the initial
catastrophe and disruption of services; this may include subsequent loss
of funding, employee attrition and damage to the agency’s reputation. (p.
9)
Theoretical Frameworks
Multiple developmental cycles for continuity of operation planning can be
found in the body of literature (Gibb & Buchanan, 2006; Lam, 2002; Maheshwari,
Rahul, Gaurav, & Singh, 2010; Shaw & Harrald, 2004; Smit, 2005; Smith, 2002).
FEMA promotes the continuity program management cycle (CPMC) as a
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standardized management cycle that ensures consistency across all continuity
programs. “It establishes consistent performance metrics, prioritizes
implementation plans, promulgates best practices, and facilitates consistent
cross-agency continuity evaluations” (FEMA, 2009c, p. 5). The CPMC has been
recommended by FEMA for the use of all organizations in the creation and
implementation of its continuity programs (FEMA, 2009c). The supporting
structures for CPMC lie within its leaders, staff, communications, and facilities
(FEMA, 2009c). These four key areas, built upon the foundation of in-depth
planning and program management, enable the organization to perform its
essential functions and increase its continuity capacity. The cyclical process
occurs through testing, training, and exercising the plan so that a proper
evaluation may be made on the process and corrective actions taken if
necessary. This cyclical process is common with all BCP models in that testing
and training are utilized in order to determine discrepancies or weaknesses in the
plan and corrective measures are implemented.
Currently, FEMA is the governing body responsible for ensuring that
federal agencies have a comprehensive and effective program in place which
ensures essential Federal functions are maintained under all hazards and
circumstances (FEMA, 2001). This responsibility includes coordinating “the
federal government’s role in preparing for, preventing, mitigating the effects of,
responding to, and recovering from all domestic disasters, whether natural or
man-made, including acts of terrors” (FEMA, 2010c, para.1). With all the
numerous activities that fall under FEMA’s responsibilities, the core of their
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existence is to build and support our nation’s emergency management system
(FEMA, 2010h). With this said, FEMA (2009a) has created standards for COOP.
The components for these standards consist of 10 elements of a viable continuity
capability along with four supporting components of a continuity program
foundation. These elements, which serve as the framework necessary for COOP
in this study, include the following: (a) essential functions; (b) orders of
succession; (c) delegation of authority; (d) continuity facilities; (e) continuity
communications; (f) vital records management; (g) human capital; (h) test,
training, and exercise programs; (i) devolution of control and direction; (j)
reconstitution operations; (k) program plans and procedures; (l) risk
management; (m) budgeting and acquisition of resources; and (n) continuity plan
operational phases and implementation. (FEMA, 2009a; FEMA, 2009c).
These main categories are prevalent in the literature. For instance, the
National Fire Protection Association (2010) compares its criteria for business
continuity programs with the Disaster Recovery Institute International (DRII)
Professional Practices for Business Continuity Practitioners and the Disaster
Recovery Institute International as well as with the elements of the Department of
Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Gibb and
Buchanan (2006) also mentioned these elements in their article A Framework for
Business Continuity Management. The NFPA (2010) has created charts that
compare these elements based on content of each organization’s particular
framework.
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All-Hazard Approach. An all-hazard approach is a philosophy that current
disaster and emergency management agencies use to address the essential
phases of emergency management (Whitworth, 2006). Many public institutions
have prepared for these uncertain events through the development of all-hazard
planning (McConnell & Drennan, 2006). This approach seeks to identify all
potential threats that may disrupt normal operations and essential functions and
conduct risk assessments and vulnerability analyses that address mitigation,
preparedness, response, and recovery (Whitworth, 2006). An all-hazard
approach seems to comply with the goal of continuity planning in that it seeks to
reduce the consequences of any disruptive event (FEMA, 2009c).
Strategic Approach. The strategic approach utilizes a top-down model in
which all business recovery activities flow from the organization’s strategic goals
(Institute of Management and Administration [IOMA], 2007). It is “an approach
that is business-driven, based on a combination of planning and management,
and potentially leads to long-term value creation and organizational advantage”
(Herbane, Elliott, & Swartz, 2004, p. 439). Ritchie (2004) noted that the scope
and direction of the organization should take into account changing
environments, markets, and customers with the primary purpose of meeting
stakeholder expectations. The strategic approach strays away from following
“best practices” in business continuity planning because each corporation has
different objectives that target the peculiar dimensions of its business.
Holistic Approach. The holistic approach is very similar to the strategic
approach. The holistic approach “identifies potential impacts that threaten an
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organisation and provides a framework for building resilience and the capability
for an effective response that safeguards the interests of its key stakeholders,
reputation, brand and value creating activities” (Business Continuity Institute
[BCI], 2007). Woodman (2007) used this BCI definition as the foundation for the
research conducted by the Chartered Management Institute from his study. By
definition, BCI seems to resemble the strategic approach with the only difference
between the priorities of the models. The holistic approach to BCP seeks to
assess and address every business function within the organization with the idea
that segmentation by its very nature is incomplete (Glenn, cited in Ketterer et al.,
2008).
Business Assurance and Risk Mitigation Approach. The business
assurance and risk mitigation (BARM) approach allows organizations to
implement high-impact continuity and security elements at a minimum cost
(Shaw & Smith, 2010). This approach seeks to validate the practice of continuity
planning by determining if the implementation of continuity practices is worth the
financial cost. This tactic is accomplished by comparing “the cost of
implementing practices versus the cost of a major security or continuity flaw
which may result in significant loss of business, growth and viability of the
organization” (Shaw & Smith, 2010, p. 332). Shaw and Smith (2010) agree that
the developing stage of BCP should be kept simple for the understanding of all
employees. This training can take place during new employee orientation as a
cost-saving measure. Emergency evacuation and tabletop exercises should be
meaningful and simple.

75
Collegiate Athletic Departments
Universities are beginning to take action regarding continuity planning.
Six universities (Tulane University, University of Alaska-Fairbanks, University of
California-Berkeley, University of Miami, University of North Carolina-Wilmington,
and University of Washington) have collaborated with FEMA and created a
document titled Building a Disaster-Resistant University (FEMA, 2003). Other
documents, such as ERM in Higher Education (University Risk Management and
Insurance Association, 2007), Developing a Strategy to Manage Enterprise-wide
Risk in Higher Education (Cassidy, Goldstein, Johnson, Mattie, & Morley, 2001),
and Continuity Planning for Schools and Universities (Henderson, 2005;
Henderson, December 2005), share similar concerns regarding risk management
and continuity planning at institutions of higher education. These documents
focus on pre-disaster planning and mitigation actions and shed light on the
unique planning considerations of institutions of higher education. Even though
these documents fail to cover all aspects of continuity planning, they do take into
consideration multiple elements of a viable continuity plan. Henderson (2005)
reported that even if a university has a COOP plan in place, each organizational
unit within that university should be responsible for its own specific
responsibilities, which include disaster preparations and response assignments.
Henderson stated that it is not uncommon for some departments of schools and
universities to have excellent plans while other departments have no plans
(2005). This includes athletic departments. Athletic departments are found in
most colleges and universities in the United States (Hall, Marciani, Cooper, &
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Phillips, 2010). For instance, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
houses over 1,300 member institutions (Hall, Bowers, & Martin, 2010). Other
athletic associations include the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics
(NAIA) and the National Junior College Athletic Association (NJCAA).
Multiple disruptive events have caused havoc at various athletic events
causing change of venues, loss of revenue, injuries, and deaths. In order to
combat against these disruptive events and provide a safe environment for
everyone, athletic departments must be proactive in assuring that necessary
steps are implemented to maintain normal operations. Creating, implementing,
and practicing continuity of operation planning reduces the chaos caused by
disruptive events and expedites the process of returning to normal operations. All
institutions are vulnerable to various potential hazards and they must be capable
of responding to a continuity incident or event at a given time (FEMA, 2009c).
Potential Hazards
Inclement Weather. Normal operations can be affected by all types of
potential hazards. Natural hazards such as hurricanes, floods, and tornados are
usually the culprits that cause most of the disruptions of normal operations.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita catapulted the awareness for the need of COOP
planning in higher education and athletic departments. Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita displaced collegiate athletes to various institutions around the country
(Wolverton, 2005). Even before this major disaster occurred, literature concluded
that institutions were not prepared for such an event. However, despite the lack
of preparedness, Tulane University became an example to the other institutions
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by the way it communicated to its students. The university’s president, Scott S.
Cowen, posted a blog on Tulane’s website that informed faculty, staff, and
students of the progress that was being made on behalf of those involved. After
it was apparent that the university would remain closed at least though the fall
semester, he focused on getting help for the students. On September 1, 2005,
he was able to speak with representatives from the American Council on
Education, the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant
Colleges, and the American Association of State Colleges and Universities.
Later that day, a conference call was held to discuss how other universities
around the country could provide assistance to the students at Tulane. These
accrediting bodies of Higher Education along with the American Association of
Community Colleges, the Council of Independent Colleges, and the Association
of Jesuit Colleges and Universities made a decision to allow currently paid
students to attend their respective institutions without charge for tuition.
Provisions for student athletes were also included in the plan. Cowen (2005)
made clear that the athletic program was an integral part of reestablishing its
program. Cowen stated that “we want our athletes to carry the torch, face, and
name of Tulane University during this difficult time” (p.1). However, even though
the financial aspect was covered for athletics, other problems arose.
Hurricane Katrina and Rita are just two of the many examples found in
the body of literature of where inclement weather has caused havoc upon athletic
departments. For example, in 2010, the Iowa State Cyclones closed multiple
parking lots for the opening football game due to summer flooding (“Parking for
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First Iowa State Football Game Impacted by Flooding,” 2010). Even though the
flooding did not impact the game itself, it caused loss of revenues for the facility
as well as last minute planning to redirect traffic to other parking lots. Multiple
tailgaters were forced to leave their recreational vehicles at home due to lack of
parking space. In 2008, a tornado ripped a hole in the Georgia Dome roof where
the Southeastern Conference men’s basketball tournament was being played.
The tournament had to be postponed and moved to a smaller stadium across
town with the only fans being immediate family members of the players and the
schools’ band members and cheerleaders (Dougherty, 2010). In 2002 a tornado
blasted through the Mississippi University for Women’s (MUW) campus causing
significant damage to multiple buildings with one building being completely
destroyed. Other damages caused by this tornado included loss of power lines,
destroyed cars, and multiple shattered windows on campus. Fortunately, no
deaths occurred on campus (MUW, 2002). Hurricane Camille caused
catastrophic damage to the USM’s Gulf Coast Research Lab in 1969 (USM,
2010). An unusual amount of heavy snow in Britain caused thousands of
schools to close and forced the cancellation of multiple sporting events including
the postponement of two League Cup soccer games (“Britain Blasted by Heavy
Snow,” 2010). During the Vancouver Olympics in Canada, the first official
training run was canceled for women’s downhill skiing due to dense fog
(“Vancouver Olympics Cancel Trial Run,” 2010). Many other problems that arose
at the Vancouver Olympics can be attributed to an unusual rise in temperatures
and the lack of snow and ice (“Vancouver Olympics Unusual Temperatures,”
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2010). Broom (cited in “Vancouver Olympics Unusual Temperatures,” 2010)
reported that over 28,000 tickets were canceled due to the weather and
represented a revenue loss of $1.5 million. Even though multiple hours of time
and effort were put into making Canada shine during this worldwide event, the
lack of cooperation in weather had the opposite effect.
Biological Hazards. Inclement weather, such as hurricanes, floods, and
tornados, are not the only culprits that cause disruptions of normal operations.
Other natural hazards have been documented to have the same effect on day-today operations. Concerning biological natural hazards in Manila, Philippines, the
Commission of Higher Education postponed college classes because of an H1N1
threat (Tan, 2009). The same thing happened in Alabama when Stillman College
had to cancel a football game due to fears created by H1N1 virus (“Alabama
College Forfeits Football Game Due to H1N1 Fears,” 2009). However, even this
type of disaster is not new to athletics. In 1989, Siena campus experienced a
measles outbreak which caused several basketball games including the North
Atlantic Conference Tournament to be quarantined (Siena Saints, 2011).
Human Hazards. Another common type of hazard which has caused
havoc in the university and sporting realm are human-caused events. Included in
these events are the publicized shootings that occurred at Alabama, Virginia
Tech, and more recently at the University of Texas. Terrorism also is included
under human-caused events and has become a force to be reckoned with.
Barbisch (2005) stated, “The objective in terrorism is to create destruction and
chaos that result in feelings of overwhelming fear and vulnerability for those
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under attack” (p. 77). Since the attacks of 9/11, America has finally
comprehended the imminent danger that terrorists pose to this country. Even
though these attacks were not the first terrorist attacks in America, they were the
most powerful in their effects (Johnson, 2005). It is an extremely hard task to
fight against terrorism because terrorists do not value human life and they are
willing to sacrifice themselves in order to reach their objective. Terrorism is
unpredictable because not all terrorists need a purpose or an objective to commit
an act of violence (Johnson, 2005). In October 2005 a student from the
University of Oklahoma committed suicide by detonating a 3-pound bomb 200
yards from Memorial Stadium (Gardiner, 2006). This same student reportedly
tried to get in the facility two times but was stopped by security in order to check
his backpack. The student then fled to a tree where the explosives detonated
possibly unintentionally. It was ruled a suicide but no one is positive that it was
not an attempted terrorist attack (Faulk, 2005). The National Football League
Commissioner Roger Goodell stated that sports-packed stadiums pose a real risk
for terrorism. Goodell stated that
We have to remain vigilant and our efforts must be geared toward an
aggressive position to keep attacks from happening at our sporting events.
Because if it happens in another stadium, then it will affect us all. We have
to make sure that our fans come to games, feel comfortable about being
there and know that they will be safe. (p. 2)
Hall et al. (2008) reported suicide terrorism is an effective way to achieve
the goal of mass casualties and mass humiliation. Hall et al. continue to contend
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that it is impossible to ensure human-caused events do not occur; therefore, it is
imperative that organizations prepare, respond, and recover for these types of
emergencies.
Terrorism is only one example of human-caused hazards that disrupt
sporting events. Other examples of hazards that have caused problems at
sporting events are malfunctions in equipment or supplies. For example, a minor
league baseball team experienced a malfunction in its firework display causing
fans to run for safety and injuring two people (“Firework Malfunction,” 2010).
Technological Hazards. Escalators are another potential problem at
sporting events. There are nearly 6,000 escalator-related injuries reported at
emergency rooms throughout the United States each year (“Scottrade Accident
is Probed,” 2010). However, no matter what causes the disruption, institutions
need to be prepared. According to Fried (2010), “Safety is the most important
element for any facility” (p. 299). The National Collegiate Athletic Association
(2010) echoes Fried by stating that “it is the responsibility of each member
institution to protect the health of and provide a safe environment for each of its
participating student-athletes” (p. 3). Customers and consumers need to know
that facilities are prepared to handle a worst case scenario (Fried, 2010).
Forseeability is essential for proper security management. Nearly every facility
will have some security concerns, but proper planning can prevent many of these
security and safety problems experienced in the past (Fried, 2010).
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NCAA Division 1 Studies
Even though literature is lacking concerning COOP in collegiate athletic
departments, multiple studies have been conducted on certain continuity
elements at Division 1 athletic departments that have led the author to suspect
that COOP planning may be needed in collegiate athletic departments. The
following studies have focused on emergency preparedness and planning at
NCAA Division 1 schools and universities.
Beckman (2006) studied awareness and perceptions of emergency
responders that may be used in the event of an emergency at a Division 1A
football game. Beckman simulated a tabletop exercise by using 27 participants
including representation from agencies such as the institution’s athletic
department, AAA ambulance, university police, American Red Cross, police
department, fire department, State Health Department, State Department of
Homeland Security, Emergency Management, and other Institutional decision
makers responsible for emergency response. The participants were required to
attend a four-hour tabletop session and take a pretest and posttest. The
questionnaire asked 18 statements regarding awareness and perceptions of
emergency response training, agency and interagency roles and responsibilities
during an emergency, and the attractiveness of Division 1A collegiate stadiums
as a terrorist target. Participants of the study were given the institution’s
emergency action plan to assess its effectiveness during the exercise; however,
many of the responders indicated that they were not familiar with the plan.

83
Overall, this study revealed a lack of testing and training programs in Division 1
athletic departments.
Cunningham (2007) surveyed 238 athletic administrators from 119
Division 1A football athletic departments to determine perceived capabilities in
regard to event security management. Questions from the survey incorporated
themes such as emergency evacuation planning, emergency management,
security policies, agency collaboration, credential control, perimeter control,
liability, and spectator control. According to Cunningham, each of these themes
is needed for effective security event management. Participation in the study
was limited to 40% (n = 81) of the administrators responsible for game day
security. Of these respondents, 60% had no formal training or education in event
security management.
Cunningham (2007) is not the only study that reveals weaknesses in
athletic department preparedness. Baker, Connaughton, Zhang, and Spengler
(2007) investigated risk management measures implemented after September
11, 2001, in regard to terrorism. Baker et al. surveyed football stadium managers
for all NCAA Division 1A football stadiums. As a result, the study revealed 47%
of participants had never received terrorism-related training. One positive
statistic that evolved through the study was 87% of football stadiums had
emergency action plans and these plans are reviewed at least annually.
However, even though these institutions are compliant with literature
recommendations, they fail miserably in providing training. Baker et.al. (2007)
reported that only 25% of these institutions have emergency action plans,

84
actually practice mock or simulated attacks, and only 13% provide formal training
to their staff regarding terrorism training. Other researchers, such as Pantera et
al. (2003), continue to confirm similar findings in regard to training preparedness
in athletic venues. These studies reveal a major need for schools to train their
staff and personnel on how to effectively respond to an emergency.
A survey of lightning policies was conducted at 48 Division 1 football
institutions from Florida, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania
and concluded that only 8% (n = 4) of these institutions have a written lightning
policy (Walsh, Hanley, Graner, Beam, & Bazluki, 1997). These particular states
were selected for the study because they ranked in the top 5 for combined
injuries and deaths in a 35-year timeframe which correlates to 31% of the 13,012
reported injuries and deaths from lightning in the United States. Gratz, Church,
and Noble (2004) conducted a similar study of Division 1 football stadiums in an
attempt to promote lightning safety policies at these large stadiums. Gratz et al.
reported an 18% increase in college football attendance from nearly 29.3 million
to over 34.6 million from the four years starting in 2000-2003. “Lightning is the
most dangerous weather hazard that people encounter each year” (Gratz et al.,
2004, p. 3), and stadiums are continually increasing in total attendance at football
games nearly every year. Therefore, institutions should consider the safety of
spectators if and when lightning strikes their stadiums.
These previous studies provide reasons to doubt athletic departments’
level of preparedness regarding COOP. Therefore, this study will assess NCAA
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Division 1 athletic departments’ continuity of operations planning preparedness
and determine if demographic variables influence their level of preparedness.

Methodology
Participants and Procedure
The participants of this study included a stratified, voluntary sample of
senior, associate, and assistant athletic directors, and facility directors from
NCAA Division 1 athletic programs nationwide. All NCAA Division 1 schools
listed in 2008-2009 data from the U.S. Department of Education (2008-2009)
were asked to voluntarily participate in this study (N=344). The researcher used
Survey Monkey, an online measuring tool, to administer and gather the data. An
email was sent to the participants explaining the nature of the study with the
survey link attached in the email. After the initial survey was sent, a survey
reminder was sent to those schools that failed to complete the survey each week
for three weeks. The link for the survey remained open for approximately 6
weeks.
Instrument
The questionnaire, Athletic Department Survey of Continuity of Operation
Planning Preparedness, was created by using FEMA’s guidelines for Continuity
of Operation Planning. The instrument went through content and face validity
measures using a focus group and a panel of experts to determine relevance,
clarity, appropriateness, and other issues regarding the nature of the
instrumentation (Krueger, 1998). The expert panel consisted of personnel with
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extensive training in Continuity of Operation Planning Procedures such as an
emergency and fire safety coordinator from the Institution of Higher Learning
Board, a flood plan development officer from city government, an assistant facility
director from an NCAA Division 1 university, and an assistant vice president of
information systems from a community bank. Feedback was assessed and the
instrument was refined. Approval from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) was
granted and a pilot study was conducted using senior, associate, and assistant
athletic directors and facility directors of universities and colleges who were
classified as a NCAA Division II school. Even though the pilot study produced a
Cronbach alpha statistic score of .985, the researcher trimmed down the survey
to 28 questions due to multiple participants failing to complete the survey. The
final Chronbach Alpha statistic for this study was .973, which indicated that the
instrument produced reliable scores for these respondents.
The survey consisted of Part I: Athletic Department Survey of Continuity of
Operation Planning Preparedness and Part II: Demographics.
Part I: Athletic Department Survey of Continuity of Operation Planning
Preparedness contained 26 questions derived from the 10 elements of a viable
continuity capability and 4 supporting components outlined in the Continuity
Guidance for Non-Federal Entities (FEMA, 2009c). The elements and
components include the following: (a) essential functions; (b) orders of
succession; (c) delegation of authority; (d) continuity facilities; (e) continuity
communications; (f) vital records management; (g) human capital; (h) test,
training, and exercise programs; (i) devolution of control and direction; (j)
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reconstitution operations; (k) program plans and procedures; (l) risk
management; (m) budgeting and acquisition of resources; and (n) continuity plan
operational phases and implementation. Questions from the Athletic Department
Survey of Continuity of Operation Planning Preparedness was assessed using a
5-point Likert scale with 1 being No Progress, 2 being Limited Progress, 3 being
Moderate Progress, 4 being Substantial Progress and 5 being Objective
Achieved. These five categories came from the task rating criteria listed in the
Continuity Evaluation Tool: Version 7 (FEMA, 2009b) and are categorically
defined as: 1. no progress has been made toward achieving the identified
continuity requirement; 2. preliminary efforts have been initiated such as plans to
develop this aspect of the capability; 3. significant efforts are underway but
important gaps remain; 4. Efforts in this area are established and mature with few
non-significant gaps; 5. Requirement is fully achieved with regard to this
capability.
Part II: Demographics included the school’s name, conference affiliation
of school, location of school, number of students enrolled at school, athletic
budget, orientation of school (private or public), and whether the school has
experienced a presidential disaster declaration within the last 10 years. A
presidential disaster declaration was defined as an institution receiving federal
funding due to a disaster. The student body and the athletic budget consisted of
four categories based on quartile percentages calculated from NCAA Division 1
schools using figures from 2009 equity in athletics data retrieved from the U.S.
Department of Education (2008-2009). The student categories are < 5,000,
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5,001 to 10,000, 10,001 to 15,000, and > 15,000. The athletic budget categories
are < $9,500,000, $9,500,000 to $14,500,000, $14,500,001 to $27,000,000, and
> $27,000,000.
Data Analysis
Based upon the exploratory nature of this study, the focus was to assess
the level of preparedness of COOP in athletic departments. Therefore, the initial
data analysis included descriptive statistics of frequencies, means, and standard
deviations of the 26 Likert scale items taken from the Athletic Department Survey
of Continuity of Operation Planning Preparedness. In addition to these
descriptive statistics, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to analyze H1
through H6 with the alpha level set at 0.05. Tukey’s HSD test was used to follow
up on any significant ANOVA’s found within the hypotheses.
Results
The results of this study are presented numerically based on the six
hypotheses that directed this study. The results will include demographic
differences and significant findings found in the data.
Region. Overall means were reported by the 10 geographical regions
defined by FEMA. Region 1 reported the highest level of preparedness (M =
3.83, SD= 0.63). Region six reported an average overall level of preparedness
(M = 3.17, SD = 1.13). The variance for this region was the highest reported,
indicating a wider range of variability between respondents in that region. Only
region 7 had a mean less than 3.00 (M = 2.89, SD = 0.74). All other regions
reported levels of preparedness ranging from 3.37 to 3.76. Region 10 was not

89
represented in the study because there were no respondents from that region. A
One-Way Analysis of Variance was conducted on H1 to determine if geographical
location makes a difference in the level of preparedness among athletic
programs. With an alpha level of .05, the ANOVA results yielded non-significant
findings, F (8, 81) = 1.013, p = .433.
Conference Membership. Overall means were reported by conference
membership. There were seven conferences represented in this study because
other conferences had a low number of respondents. To be included in the
analysis, a conference had to have at least 6 respondents. The conferences
represented are Atlantic Coast, Big East, Missouri Valley, Patriot League,
Southeastern, Southern, and the Sun Belt. The conference with the highest
reported level of preparedness was Sun Belt Conference (M = 3.63, SD = 0.93).
Three conferences had means under 3.00. These were Missouri Valley (M =
2.65, SD = 0.23), Southern (M = 2.60, SD = 0.78), and Southeastern (M = 2.78,
SD = 0.78). A One-Way Analysis of Variance was conducted on H2 to determine
if conference affiliation makes a difference in the level of preparedness among
athletic programs. With an alpha level of .05, the ANOVA results yielded nonsignificant findings, F (6, 22) = 1.310, p = .294.
Number of Students. Overall level of preparedness was calculated based
the institution’s student body size. The institutional sizes included less than
5,000 students, 5,001 to 10,000 students, 10,001 to 15,000, and over 15,000
students. Institutions with 5,001 to 10,000 students reported the lowest level of
preparedness (M = 3.35, SD = 0.82). Institutions with 10,001 to 15,000 students
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reported the highest level of preparedness (M = 3.66, SD = 0.96). A One-Way
Analysis of Variance was conducted on H3 to determine if number of students
makes a difference in the level of preparedness among athletic programs. With
an alpha level of .05, the ANOVA results in yielded non-significant findings, F (3,
86) = .574, p = .633.
Disaster Declared. Level of preparedness was examined based on
whether the institution has experienced a presidential declared disaster.
Institutions that had experienced a presidential declared disaster reported lower
levels of preparedness (M = 3.28, SD = 1.27) than institutions that had not
experienced a presidential declared disaster (M = 3.43, SD = 0.78). A One-Way
Analysis of Variance was conducted on H4 to determine if a presidential declared
disaster makes a difference in the level of preparedness among athletic
programs. With an alpha level of .05, the ANOVA results yielded non-significant
findings, F (2, 88) = .168, p = .846.
Athletic Budget. Level of preparedness based on total athletic budget was
examined. There were four categories: under 9.5 million, 9.5 million – 14.5
million, 14.5 million – 27 million, and over 27 million. Levels of preparedness for
these categories were all above 3.00, with institutions with 14.5 million – 27
million budgets reporting the highest level of preparedness (M = 3.66, SD =
0.69). Institutions with 9.5 million to 14.5 million budgets reported the lowest
levels of preparedness (M = 3.02, SD = 0.72). A One-Way Analysis of Variance
was conducted on H5 to determine if athletic budget makes a difference in the
level of preparedness among athletic programs. With an alpha level of .05, the
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ANOVA results yielded significant findings, F (3, 85) = 3.135, p = .030. A post
hoc test was completed using Tukey’s HSD test to find where the differences
occurred. Statistically significant differences were found between the 9.5-14.5
million and the 14.5 -27 million groups. The researcher cannot explain why these
differences occurred other than to speculate that the sample size may have had
a factor in the findings.
Type of Institution. Finally, overall level of preparedness was analyzed
based on whether the institutions were public or private. Private institutions
reported higher levels of preparedness (M = 3.51, SD = 0.72) than public
institutions (M = 3.41, SD = 0.84). A One-Way Analysis of Variance was
conducted on H6 to determine if type of institution makes a difference in the level
of preparedness among athletic programs. With an alpha level of .05, the
ANOVA results yielded non-significant findings, F (1, 88) = .345, p = .559.
Discussion
In summary, six hypotheses were tested in this study. One hypothesis
indicated statistically significant results. This hypothesis indicated that there was
a statistically significant difference for overall level of preparedness between
schools with budgets of 9.5 million – 14.5 million and schools with budgets of
14.5 – 27 million. There were no statistically significant differences in overall
level of preparedness based on geographical region, conference membership,
student body size, previous presidential disaster declaration, and type of
institution.
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Every category listed in the six hypotheses was represented with the
exception of region 10 from FEMA’s ten regions. Region 10 includes the states
of Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington (FEMA, 2010d). Failure of
representation from this region may be due to the low number of NCAA Division
1 athletic departments within this region (n=12). Over 37 percent (N=130)
started the survey; however, only 27 percent (n=91) completed it.
A closer view of the data reveals that schools are better prepared in areas
of identifying delegations of authority and essential functions, but need more
improvement in the areas of tests, training and exercises. These findings
support the studies of Beckman (2006) and Baker et.al. (2007).
It is interesting to note that region one, which had the highest
preparedness level, had the fewest presidential disaster declarations from
January 2000 to March 2003 with a total of 19. During this same time frame,
region 4 had nearly double the average of the other regions regarding
presidential disaster declarations with a total of 79; however, their level of
preparedness fell below the average mean of all the regions. According to the
current study, this statistic is validated by the lower number mean presented by
number of schools that have experienced a presidential declared disaster on
campus as opposed to those that have not experienced such a disaster.
Therefore, the data suggests that the occurrence of disasters in a region does
not influence level of preparedness in COOP. This finding opposes the
geographic proximity factor and the temporal proximity factor that Dunaway
(2010) mentions as influential factors for COOP in organizations.
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Dunaway (2010) and Woodman (2007) mentioned that size of an
organization may influence the implementation of COOP. The theory supports
that COOP planning is more likely to be part of a large organization than a small
or medium organization. Demographics regarding size of the athletic department
were assessed by using size of the student body and total athletic budget. Both
of these factors failed to support the previous research. There was a significant
factor regarding athletic budget, but it was contrary to previous findings. The
differences found was between the two middle categories of total athletic budget
with the lower monetary group of athletic departments being more prepared than
the other group of athletic departments. The researcher believes that this
significant factor may diminish with a greater number of participants from the
population.
Another factor that Woodman (2007) mentioned as influential in
determining COOP in organizations is if the organization is publically or privately
owned. Woodman says that COOP in public sector organizations are more
common than in private or non-for-profit organizations. Again, the current study
failed to support this conclusion by revealing no significant finding in these two
factors.
The data also revealed nearly 40 participants failed to answer any of the
questions regarding COOP. One explanation for the failure to complete the
survey was explained from experts from the National Center for Spectator Sports
Safety and Security (NCS4). Cooper (2011) suggests some athletic departments
may not have completed the survey because they do not view security issues as
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part of their responsibilities. Such athletic departments assume COOP
responsibilities are being taking care of by another organization such as campus
police or local law enforcement. Even though continuity of operation planning
may be in place, the lack of collaboration and communication is nonexistent
between these two organizations. Therefore, the participants may have looked
at the questionnaire, and determined that COOP was not part of their duties.
Athletic departments should be concerned with their perceived lack of
preparedness in COOP. Fried (2010) says that the primary responsibility of
facility managers is to ensure the safety of all employees and guests. The best
way to ensure the safety of your human capital with the extra benefits of
maintaining essential functions of the organization is to have a detailed COOP
plan. This plan should be continually tested, evaluated, and updated in order to
remain effective and efficient and provide vital services to those in need.
Future studies should focus on determining if the athletic department has
delegated COOP planning to multiple staff members or an outside agency.
Qualitative case studies, which interviews athletic staff and reviews written job
descriptions, could be conducted to determine if COOP responsibilities are
actually in place. Case studies should also be conducted on those athletic
departments which have experienced a disruption of normal operations.
Questions derived from FEMA’s guidelines for COOP should be examined for
relevancy within the athletic department. A list of primary essential functions and
categorical rankings of COOP elements would be useful to provide a foundation

95
for creating guidelines, procedures, and checklists for implementing COOP in
athletic departments.
Conclusion
Regardless the reason of mediocre planning in athletic departments, the
fact remains that NCAA Division 1 athletic departments are not prepared when it
comes to COOP. Multiple NCAA studies along with examples of NCAA athletic
disruptions conclude that athletic departments are gambling when it comes to
disasters. They are gambling with hopes that a major disaster does not visit their
campus. However, with the rise of natural disasters and the prevalent risk of
terrorism, the odds seem to be against them. Athletic departments need to take
ownership of their organization and provide the safest measures possible to
increase their long-term survival. Fans, athletes, and employees, are some of
the stakeholders relying on athletic departments to be prepared during a
disruption of normal operations. After all, isn’t COOP considered a basic
entitlement to our nation’s citizens?
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CHAPTER V
STUDY TWO
INCORPORATING FEMA’S GUIDELINES FOR CONTINUITY OF
OPERATIONS PLANNING IN NCAA DIVISION 1 ATHLETIC DEPARTMENTS
Introduction
The National Collegiate Association of Athletics dictates that NCAA
Athletic Departments have the responsibility to provide a safe environment for all
student athletes (NCAA, 2010). Providing a safe environment includes planning
and preparing for potential events such as inclement weather, biological hazards,
human hazards, technological hazards, and/or a combination of these events.
Athletic departments can provide a safe environment by creating and
implementing an all hazard approach to disruptions of normal operations referred
to as continuity of operations planning (COOP). This comprehensive planning
process provides the best safety measures for all involved personnel and
benefits the athletic department by ensuring that essential functions are
maintained continually or shortly after a disruption of normal operations.
Rationalization for the need for COOP planning may be understood by
examining the athletic department at Tulane University during and after
Hurricane Katrina. Athletes were temporally stranded in Birmingham, Alabama,
Jackson, MS, and Houston, Texas. They finally settled in at four different
universities: Southern Methodist University, Louisiana Tech University, Texas A
& M, and Texas Tech (Wolverton, 2005). Housing was not the only problem that
the athletic department faced. Many of the athletes had to rely on handouts from
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other organizations to provide them with uniforms and equipment in order to
compete against other teams. Fortunately, many organizations provided
assistance in the forms of housing, transportation, food, and cash as an effort to
support the athletic department (Wolverton, 2005).
Multiple studies conducted at NCAA athletic departments reveal
discrepancies and weakness in various elements of COOP (Baker,
Connaughton, Zhang, & Spengler, 2007; Beckman, 2006; Cunningham, 2007;
Gratz, Church, & Noble, 2004; Hall, 2006; Walsh, Hanley, Graner, Beam, &
Bazluki, 1997). Areas of concerns in these studies included risk management,
emergency preparedness, testing and training procedures, and emergency
action policies. Historical examples such as: the tornado affecting the
Southeastern Conference basketball championship game in Georgia (Dougherty,
2010), the measles outbreak on the Siena Saints campus causing the North
Atlantic Conference basketball tournament to be quarantined (Siena Saints,
2011), and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita displacing athletes from over 12 colleges
and universities (Wolverton, 2005), support these previous studies. According to
the commissioner of the Sun Belt Conference, Wright Waters said most
institutions do not know how to handle large disasters that displace athletes or
cancel multiple athletic events (Wolverton, 2005). Even Britton Banowsky,
commissioner of Conference USA, has encouraged more detailed planning for
future disasters.
Evidence seems to support the lack of detailed emergency planning in
athletic departments. However, strides are being made to mitigate this problem.

98
For example, FEMA has collaborated with six universities and created a
document called Building a Disaster Resistant University. This resource primary
acts as a means for the identification of hazards and risk assessment, organizing
and identifying resources, and developing and implementing a mitigation plan
(FEMA, 2003). The National Association of College and University Business
Officers (2008) have also released the National Campus Safety and Security
Project which assists universities in their endeavors to become more resilient to
hazards. These two tools specifically address the uniqueness of universities by
encouraging an all hazard approach to emergency preparedness by preparing
for, mitigating the effects of, and responding to a disaster. However, both tools
fail to consider the recovery of the disaster. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to
promote the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) COOP
framework as the standard for preparing, assessing, and conducting continuity of
operations planning in collegiate athletic departments.
Background
NCAA Athletic Department Preparedness
Athletic departments with the United States have been effected by multiple
hazards. The National Fire Protection Agency (2010) has identified three general
categories of potential hazards that may impact people, property, or the
environment. These categories are natural hazards, human-caused events, and
technologically caused events. These categories are listed below with some
events that have caused disruptions in normal operations in collegiate athletic
departments.
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Natural Hazards. Three subcategories fall under natural hazards;
Geological, Meteorological, and Biological (NFPA, 2010). Geological hazards
include earthquakes, volcanoes, landslides, tsunamis, and glaciers. An
earthquake in at Yale University delayed the New Haven Open tennis
tournament for more than two hours. The 5.8 magnitude earthquake caused the
evacuation of over 4,000 people. The facility had to be inspected for damage
before play could be resumed (“Quake forces evaluation at new haven open,”
2011). In 2010, a tsunami warning closed the University of Hawaii’s campus. All
events were canceled including a men’s basketball game scheduled with Nevada
(Gardner, 2010).
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, potentially the worst meteorological hazard
to hit athletic departments, impacted at least 12 athletic departments by
scattering their athletes across the country. Tulane, one of the disrupted
institutions, sent athletes to multiple sites for food and housing. The athletes
were dependent on other institutions and organizations to provide equipment and
uniforms in order to participate in competition. Some of other meteorological
hazards include flooding, fires, snow, lightning strikes, tornados, hurricanes, and
extreme temperatures. In 2010, the Iowa State Cyclones had to redirect traffic
and closed multiple parking lots due to summer flooding (“Parking for First Iowa
State Football Game Impacted by Flooding,” 2010). The flooding caused many
fans to leave their recreation vehicles at home and forfeit tailgating spots
because of saturated spaces. Concerning tornados, the Southeastern
Conference men’s basketball tournament was moved in 2008 because a twister
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ripped a hole in the Georgia Dome. The tournament resumed at a smaller
stadium, but fans were limited to immediate family members of the teams along
with the schools’ band and cheerleaders (Dougherty, 2010).
Biological fears regarding diseases and viruses such as the plague,
smallpox, anthrax, West Nile, and mad cow disease have affected collegiate
athletic events. In 2009, Stillman college canceled a football game due to fears
created by the H1N1 virus (“Alabama College Forfeits Football Game Due to
H1N1 Fears,” 2009). The head football coach said he felt compelled to cancel
the first game after he found out that nearly 37 players were ill. Siena University
suffered an outbreak of measles during the 1989 North Atlantic Conference
basketball tournament caused several teams to be quarantined (Siena Saints,
2011).
Human caused hazards. Human caused events can be classified as
accidental hazards and intentional hazards. Accidental hazards encompass
things like hazardous material, explosion, transportation accident, resource
shortage, air pollution (NFPA, 2010). In 2007, the University of La Verne limited
the amount of time athletes could spend outside due to poor air quality. Dust,
ash, and smoke coming from surrounding wildfires were causing health concerns
for the athletic department. Therefore, the athletic department relocated a
football game and postponed soccer games due to the air quality (Gobert, 2007).
Intentional hazards include terrorism, sabotage, war, harassment,
university violence, and criminal activity (NFPA, 2010). Some examples of
terrorism and human caused events have been displayed through publicized
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shootings at major college campuses such as the University of Alabama, the
University of Texas, and Virginia Tech University. Thirty-three people were killed
during the shooting rampage at Virginia Tech. In 1966, Charles Whitman killed
14 people and injured 31 others in his deadly attacks on the University of Texas
campus (“US university shooting kills 33,” 2007). An act of terrorism was
reported at the University of Oklahoma when a student tried to detonate a threepound bomb in Memorial Stadium (Faulk, 2005; Gardiner, 2006).
Technological Hazards. Technological hazards are those events that may
be unrelated to natural or human-cause events (NFPA, 2010). These can
include computer malfunctions, telecommunications, ancillary support equipment
and utility hazards. In 2011, the UCLA Bruins canceled a baseball game
between Cal State Fullerton because of an electrical malfunction. This
malfunction occurred nearly 30 minutes before the start of the game. The game
was not re-scheduled. (UCLA Bruins, 2011). As noted above, all of the
categorical hazards listed by the NFPA (2010) have affected collegiate athletic
departments. Historical data predicts that these events will continue to affect
athletic departments. Therefore, athletic departments need to be prepared.
NCAA Studies
The NCAA (2010) reports that an institution’s responsibility is to provide a
safe environment for its athletes; however, multiple studies concerning risk
management, emergency preparedness, testing and training procedures, and
emergency action policies reveal otherwise. Cunningham’s (2007) survey,
consisting of 81 athletic administrators from division 1 A football departments,
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reported sixty percent of athletic administrators in charge of game day security
did not have training or education in event security management. Baker,
Connaughton, Zhang, and Spengler (2007) reported 47% of football stadium
managers have never received terrorism-related training. Beckham (2006)
surveyed agencies responsible for emergency response at NCAA football games
and stated that many of the participants were not familiar with the institution’s
emergency action plan. Other weaknesses in the study revealed lack of testing
and training programs in Division 1 athletic departments. Studies regarding
lightning policies at Division 1 institutions have also revealed weaknesses
(Walsh, Hanley, Graner, Beam, & Bazluki, 1997; Gratz, Church, & Noble, 2004).
Walsh et al. (1997) stated that only 4 out of 48 Division 1 football institutions had
a written lightning policy. All of these studies reveal the need for athletic
departments to provide a safe environment for spectators, employees, and
athletes. Fried (2010) suggests that customers, including fans and athletes,
need to know that facilities are safe and are prepared to handle any type of
emergency.
Continuity of Operations Planning
Multiple frameworks are used by business continuity professionals around
the world (Gibb & Buchanan, 2006; Lam, 2002; Maheshwari, Rahul, Gaurav, &
Singh, 2010; Shaw & Harrald, 2004; Smit, 2005; Smith, 2002). All of these
frameworks are usually time-tested and refined and serve as bench marks for
industries (Swaroop, 2011). Multiple frameworks are available for business
continuity; however, FEMA’s framework should be selected as a means to
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promote uniformity across similar organizations. FEMA’s framework of continuity
should be used as the model for athletic department because “It establishes
consistent performance metrics, prioritizes implementation plans, promulgates
best practices, and facilitates consistent cross-agency continuity evaluations”
(FEMA, 2009c, p. 5).
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
FEMA is the governing body responsible for ensuring that federal
agencies have a comprehensive and effective program in place which ensures
essential federal functions are maintained under all hazards and circumstances
(FEMA, 2001). FEMA was formed in 1979 when President Jimmy Carter passed
Executive Order (EO) 12127 naming FEMA as the centralized agency
responsible for disaster-related federal emergency functions (FEMA, 2010c).
This executive order merged over 100 programs responsible for preparation and
quick response to disasters (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009).
Multiple agencies, such as the Federal Insurance Administration, the Federal
Disaster Assistance Administration, the National Fire Prevention and Control
Administration, the National Weather Service Community Preparedness
Program, and the Federal Preparedness Agency of the General Services
Administration were included in the merger (FEMA, 2010c). The purpose for the
creation of FEMA was to merge these agencies into one centralized agency as a
means to decrease the complexity of seeking federal disaster relief for states and
local governments (FEMA, 2010c).
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In May 2007, as an effort “to provide an updated, integrated approach to
maintain a national continuity capability” (p.i) under all conditions, the president
issued the National Security Presidential Directive-51/Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-20 (NSPD-51/HSPD-20) (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2008). From this policy, the Federal Continuity Directive (FCD) 2 was
created to provide additional guidance to governmental agencies in assisting with
the identification and classification of essential functions (FCD), since the
continuation of these essential functions is the primary goal of continuity (CGC1).
In an effort to provide additional resources to non-federal entities, the
Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency developed Continuity Guidance Circular 1 (CGC1), Continuity Guidance
for Non-Federal Entities. Swaroop (2011) claims that this framework has
universal applicability and can benefit organizations outside the federal arena.
FEMA’s responsibility includes coordinating “the federal government’s role
in preparing for, preventing, mitigating the effects of, responding to, and
recovering from all domestic disasters, whether natural or man-made, including
acts of terrors” (FEMA, 2010c, para.1). With all the numerous activities that fall
under FEMA’s responsibilities, the core of their existence is to build and support
the nation’s emergency management system (FEMA, 2010h). However, many
non-governmental organizations are not aware of FEMA’s guidelines for COOP
(Swaroop, 2011).
FEMA’s continuity program management cycle (CPMC) ensures
consistency across all continuity programs. The supporting structures for CPMC

105
lie within its leaders, staff, communications, and facilities (FEMA, 2009c). These
four key areas, built upon the foundation of in-depth planning and program
management, enable the organization to perform its essential functions and
increase its continuity capacity. The cyclical process occurs through testing,
training, and exercising the plan so that a proper evaluation may be made on the
process and corrective actions taken if necessary. This process is common with
all BCP models in that testing and training are utilized in order to determine
discrepancies or weaknesses in the plan and corrective measures are
implemented. The viable elements and supporting components for COOP are
covered in this model under continuity capability and are used as the framework
for this paper.
Elements of a Viable Continuity Capability
FEMA (2009a) has updated its components for viable continuity capability
which include the following: (a) essential functions; (b) orders of succession; (c)
delegation of authority; (d) continuity facilities; (e) continuity communications; (f)
vital records management; (g) human capital; (h) test, training, and exercise
programs; (i) devolution of control and direction; (j) reconstitution operations
(FEMA, 2009a; FEMA, 2009c). These main categories are prevalent in the
literature. For instance, the National Fire Protection Association (2010)
compares its criteria for business continuity programs with the Disaster Recovery
Institute International (DRII) Professional Practices for Business Continuity
Practitioners and the Disaster Recovery Institute International as well as with the
elements of the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency
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Management Agency. Gibb and Buchanan (2006) also mentioned these
elements.
Essential Functions. The foundation to any continuity plan is essential
functions; therefore, these functions must be determined before considering any
of the other continuity elements (FEMA, 2009c). Essential functions allow an
organization to provide vital services, exercise civil authority, maintain the safety
of the general public, and sustain the industrial and economic base (FEMA,
2009c). These critical functions vary depending on the organization because
they are primarily determined by the organization’s customers and their needs.
Many authors, including Cerullo and Cerullo (2004) and Tammineedi (2010), call
the process of identifying these critical functions the Business Impact Analysis
(BIA). Once risks are identified, it is critical to rank or prioritize them by
probability of occurrence and level of impact on the business. When considering
these risks for the BIA, a “worst case scenario” approach should be used
(Tammineedi, 2010). BIA phase then reviews these scenarios and attempts to
predict the impact caused by these events upon the organization’s operations
(Lasecki, 2009).
As noted earlier, a comprehensive continuity plan cannot be adequate
unless essential functions have been identified and prioritized, yet more than
40% of companies that have a so-called business continuity plan have never
conducted a business impact analysis (Cerullo & Cerullo, 2004). This failure to
include a BIA can be problematic and may contribute to businesses closing down
after a disaster. For example, Gallagher (2003) noted that 40% of enterprises
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that experience a disaster are closed down within five years. Another study cited
by Cerullo and Cerullo (2004) found that 43% of companies never reopen after a
major disaster and another 29% fail within two years. FEMA’s study on the
effects of Hurricane Andrew reported that 80% of damaged businesses without a
BCP failed within two years (Cerullo & Cerullo, 2004). Therefore, organizations
would be wise to identify their essential functions and conduct a BIA so that
crucial programs and services to the organization’s mission are not interrupted
(Health and Human Services DRLN, 2007).
Delegations of Authorities. Another element needed for a viable continuity
plan is called delegations of authorities. Pre-delegating key leaders ensures a
rapid response to emergencies by training personnel to carry out specific duties
when COOP is activated (FEMA, 2009c). FEMA recommends these delegations
be at least three positions deep to ensure that Mission Essential Functions
(MEFs) and PMEFs are carried out during an emergency. All employees should
know who is responsible to make key decisions during a continuity situation by
creating a predetermined chain of command (Momani, 2010). This plan will help
clear any confusion if a key leader is incapacitated during a crisis. Delegation of
authority should outline the authority of key decision makers in determining their
power to re-delegate functions and activities as they deem appropriate (FEMA,
2009c). Delegations of authorities should be documented and kept with the other
vital records.
Orders of Succession. Orders of succession are also an essential part of
continuity planning. In the event key personnel become unavailable to perform
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their duties, orders of succession would designate the critical roles and
responsibilities to other employees of the organization (FEMA, 2009c). These
employees would take on these roles and responsibilities if and when key
leadership were unable to perform their jobs such as death or resignation.
Orders of succession should be at least three positions deep and geographically
dispersed (FEMA, 2009c). This plan of action allows the organization to facilitate
survivability and availability of successors (Whitworth, 2006). NFPA (2010) lists
order of succession under common plan requirements. It states that entities shall
identify lines of succession and include them in continuity plans. These
succession lines should be identified by position titles rather than individual
names (Whitworth, 2006) and should be documented and kept with the other vital
records (FEMA, 2009c).
Continuity Facilities. Continuity facilities are another critical element in the
continuity planning process. The first requirement for an alternate facility is the
capability to maintain essential functions in a threat-free environment (Whitworth,
2006). Safety considerations such as security measures must be taken into
account for those employees who are being relocated to a new site (FEMA,
2009c). Before alternate facilities are determined, a risk assessment should be
conducted in order to determine the likelihood of disruptions. Training on
relocation procedures should be offered to all employees. Organizations should
also determine alternate uses for their primary facility as well as considerations
for virtual offices. Continuity facilities can be classified as a “hot site” or a “cold
site” (Whitworth, 2006). The only difference between these two facilities is that
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the hot site is fully functional to resume normal operations. The cold site may
require installation of essential equipment before normal operations can be
resumed. Another alternative option for organizations is establishment of
agreements with other businesses to use their facilities in the event of an
emergency. In any case, an inventory of equipment should be recorded with the
minimum supplies consisting of essential equipment for continued operations,
water supply, electricity, communication capabilities, and generators (Whitworth,
2006).
Devolution of Control and Direction. Devolution of control supports the
organization when leadership or key staff personnel are incapable of performing
essential functions (FEMA, 2009c). Devolution, also known as “fail over,” allows
for the transfer of essential functions from the organization’s primary staff and
facilities to other employees and facilities (Florida Atlantic University Coop Plan,
n.d.). FEMA states that the devolution plan should address notice and no notice
events. The planning should be developed as a means to identify and transfer
essential functions to a safe and secure environment as well as sustain
operational capability for an extended period (FEMA, 2009c). Universities should
consider pursuing agreements with other universities or similar entities as a
consideration in developing their devolution plan (Florida Atlantic University Coop
Plan, n.d.).
Continuity Communication. The success of any continuity plan is
dependent on effective communication internally and externally (FEMA, 2009c).
All communication tools should be reliable, redundant, and interoperable until
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normal operations can be continued (NFPA, 2010). These capabilities should be
used as advisory and warning systems for employees, stakeholders, emergency
responders, and other pertinent outside entities (NFPA, 2010). All
communications should resemble those capabilities used during day-to-day
operations. Secure and non-secure communications, such as voice systems,
video conferencing, information technology systems, and other messaging
systems, must be scrutinized on their resiliency under various threats and
disruptions (FEMA, 2009c).
Vital Records Management. Vital records are simply those files and
documents necessary for performing essential functions (Health and Human
Services DRLN, 2007). FEMA places these vital records into two separate
categories: emergency operating records and rights and interests records
(FEMA, 2009c). Emergency operating records are simply those records needed
to continue essential functions during an emergency. One of these records is the
continuity of operation plan that includes delegations of authority, staffing
assignments, orders of succession, and so forth. The other category is rights
and interests records which include documents such as payroll, social security,
insurance records, and inventory records. This category focuses on the
protection of legal and financial rights of the organization and its personnel
(FEMA, 2009c). All of these records and databases should be stored in
electronic and paper form and be made accessible to those with responsibilities
defined in the plans (Bjelmrot, 2007). Health and Human Services DRLN (2007)
states that these records should be stored in a fireproof and waterproof
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environment as well as in multiple locations. Policies should also be in place for
review and updating these records on a routine basis.
Human Capital. People are one of the most important components in
having a continuity plan. Businesses that fail to focus on the human aspect in
creating their BCP have missed the mark (Ketterer et al., 2007). Saving lives
and reducing the chance of further injuries or deaths during an emergency
should be top priority. People need to know that their well-being is not
compromised during an emergency. Communication is vital during an
emergency. Organizations should have procedures in place that incorporate a
process for accounting and contacting personnel during an emergency as well as
a contact number or website for the employee to contact the organization during
an emergency (FEMA, 2009c). Other important issues that concern employees
are pay, leave, work scheduling, and staffing. BCPs that are created with the
best interest for the employees have the greatest chance of working (Ketterer et
al., 2007).
Test, Training, and Exercise (TT&E) Programs. Test, training, and
exercise programs become the fruition of all the preparatory work put into
creating the COOP. This essential element allows the continuity manager to see
the pieces of the puzzle come together. It provides the organization immediate
feedback on the effectiveness of the plan and its ability to perform essential
functions during emergencies (FEMA, 2009c). Testing is used to ensure that
“equipment and procedures are maintained in a constant state of readiness to
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support continuity activation and operations” (FEMA, 2009c, p. K-1). Testing
should be conducted at least once a year with results of the testing documented.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2007a) created a national
standardized program called the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation
Program (HSEEP) which enables exercise planners to create, design, conduct,
and evaluate exercises to improve organizational preparedness. It should be
noted that creating and implementing exercise policies is an evolving process
that will constantly change (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007b).
Continual testing and training will assist in determining these changes.
Flin (1996) suggested multiple ways to evaluate training methods. These
methods are as follows:
The most common training methods are exercises, simulations, case
studies of major incidents, lectures (on leadership, principles of command,
operational procedures), directed reading (the military favour biographies
of famous commanders, accounts of battles and texts on command), and
on-the-job learning. (p. 70).
These training methods could be divided into two types of categorical
exercise drills: discussion-based and operational-based (Cerullo & Cerullo,
2004). Discussion-based exercises are exercises that utilize the human mind to
process a course of action during various disasters. Beckman (2006) found that
discussion-based exercises are cost-effective compared to operational exercises.
Flin (1996) found that these exercises can range anywhere from directed
readings to tabletop exercises. Some discussion-based exercises, such as
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lectures, case studies, and background readings, are used for compilation of
knowledge about a major incident. This knowledge usually comes from a
specialist who has either experienced the incident firsthand or has received a
detailed account of the particular incident (Flin, 1996). These exercise drills are
very useful in formulating an emergency response plan and providing insight on
successful and non-successful scenarios that occurred in the past.
Other training exercises, such as seminars, workshops, and tabletop drills,
are also useful in evaluating the emergency response plan (Flin, 1996). The
tabletop scenario is a specific simulation that usually consists of key personnel,
in supervisory positions, that come together to discuss possible emergency
situations (Lindell, Prater, & Perry, 2007). Any type of emergency is “fair game”
during these scenarios. Once an emergency topic is chosen, the selected group
will perform a “walk-through” analysis of the scenario. This analysis is to make
certain that everyone knows his or her specific role in responding to the disaster.
These informal discussions are usually a few hours in length and lead to a
reduction of stress among participants (McIntire, 2007).
A drill is a hands-on exercise used for a single-function response
(Beckman, 2006). This exercise is narrow and precise in nature and seeks to
improve a certain function by reducing time and effort during the response and
recovery phase. This small and limited exercise allows for immediate discussion
and feedback. Another advantage of this operational exercise is it only takes a
few hours from start to finish (McIntire, 2007). Another operational exercise is
called a functional exercise. This exercise is sometimes called a control post-
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exercise and consist of small exercises with different entities working together to
accomplish the same task (Bechman, 2006). Unlike drills, functional exercises
can incorporate other agencies in an attempt to control the situation; however,
they are still limited in scope. These exercises also are good for testing of
equipment used in an emergency. Full-scale exercises encompass all agencies
and departments that are deemed necessary to control the situation (McIntire,
2007). These large simulations involve nearly every organization that normally
would be involved in a disaster. It is treated as a real-life situation and involves
multi-agency collaboration. Each participating department can learn numerous
lessons through the use of full-scale exercises. Operational- and discussionbased exercises enable all participants to understand the key functions of ERP.
During these exercises participants will assemble and discuss their roles in an
emergency while becoming acquainted with policies and procedures set forth by
the facility’s emergency response plan (McIntire, 2007). Test, training, and
exercises are important for continuity planning. However, most sporting venues
that use these exercises to practice emergency plans and procedures usually are
found in the professional realm with collegiate venues lacking in overall security
measures (Beckman, 2006).
Reconstitution. Reconstitution is simply returning back to normal
operations and usually occurs immediately after an event (FEMA, 2009c).
Reconstitution plans should be made regardless of the level of disruption caused
by the event. It should include instructions for a safe and orderly return to the
primary facility. It can coincide with recovery and restoration procedures. A
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prioritized approach to returning to normal business operations and an
examination of the facility to make sure it is safe and operable for employees
should be included in the plan. Once the facility is determined safe and
operable, a checklist of essential equipment or other essential items that allow
the organization to function should be prioritized and completed with
communication of completion directed to a central location or a specified
individual (FEMA, 2009c). While this process is underway, essential functions
should be maintained either from the alternate site or primary facility until the
facility is ready for the transfer.
Supporting Components of COOP
There are four other components mentioned by FEMA that must be
incorporated COOP. These supporting components consist of: program plans
and procedures, risk management, budgeting and acquisition of resources, and
continuity plan operational phases and implementation (FEMA, 2009c). Colleges
and universities are promoting these components through FEMA’s document
Building a Disaster Resistant University (FEMA, 2003). FEMA has even
provided grant money for universities to become disaster resistant by using the
Disaster Resistant University (DRU) planning model (USM, 2010). The
University of Southern Mississippi (2010) mentions four universities in the state
of Mississippi have received federal funding for the purpose of preparing
campus-specific hazard mitigation plans. Many universities are using DRU
model, which incorporates the four supporting components of COOP. An
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overview of these four phases is included with the idea that these phases are
already implemented at colleges and universities.
The first phase is organizing resources (FEMA, 2003). This phase
includes formulating policies, programs, and practices in order to assess risk. A
commitment from leadership is essential in order to develop a plan for acquiring
resources needed create and support the mitigation plan (Karakasidis, 1977).
Once leadership is on board, an advisory committee should be put together to
develop a mission statement and communication plan. This committee should
also identify supporting infrastructures and important stakeholders in the
community since the campus relies on these important resources for survival
(FEMA, 2003).
Risk management and hazard identification are used to identify the level
of vulnerability of potential hazards and mitigate the effects thereof (FEMA,
2003). A risk management plan must include a comprehensive assessment that
identifies all potential hazards or threats with clarification on the magnitude and
frequency of these events (Lasecki, 2009). Once all risks have been identified,
the organization should categorize the risks by frequency and severity of the
hazard. Potential impact and damage to people, property, operations, and the
environment should be considered in the process.
Developing the mitigation plan is the next phase which examines the
indentified hazards and risk assessments and then formulates a written
mitigation plan. Goals and objectives should be formulated based on problems
that were revealed in the risk assessment process (FEMA, 2003). A
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comprehensive study of mitigating strategies found in existing literature, expert
advice, and success stories should be used to formulate the plan. Remember,
this plan must align with the organization’s mission statement (Freestone & Lee,
2007).
Adoption and implementation occurs after the plan has been written and
establishes procedures to maintain and update the plan. The athletic department
must be capable of responding to a continuity incident or event at a given time
(FEMA, 2009c). One way to achieve this readiness capability is by embedding
the mitigation plan into the organization’s culture (Freestone & Lee, 2007).
Training and awareness programs for new and existing staff should be offered on
a regular basis in order for staff to become familiar with all aspects of the plan.
Plans and procedures for activating this plan should be well-defined and include
instructions for moving to the alternate facility, moving vital records, acquiring
necessary supplies, and notifying appropriate personnel (FEMA, 2009c). Fried
(2010) mentioned one way an organization can assist in the implementation of
the risk management plan is using the ECT approach. This approach uses
seven words that end with the letters ect as an easy-to-remember guideline to
follow. These seven elements consist of reflect, deflect, detect, inspect, correct,
reinspect, and reflect. Again, this process should be cyclical in nature in order to
assure best practices are being implemented.
Conclusion
Collegiate athletic departments face the same threats of private and public
businesses. Multiple disruptive events have caused havoc at various athletic

118
events causing change of venues, loss of revenue, injuries, and deaths. Natural
disasters and terrorism continue to pose serious threats on all types of
organizations; therefore, athletic departments must become proactive in
preparing for the unexpected (Wheatman, 2001). In order to combat against
these disruptive events and provide a safe environment for everyone, athletic
departments must be proactive in assuring that necessary steps are
implemented to maintain normal operations. Creating, implementing, and
practicing COOP reduces the chaos caused by disruptive events and expedites
the process of returning to normal operations. This all-hazard approach prepares
organizations for any disruptive event by identifying all potential threats that may
disrupt normal operations (Whitworth, 2006).
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